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Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation
Adam J. MacLeod'
INTRODUCTION
L AND use regulation has become increasingly complex over the last
several decades. The rules governing the lawfulness of land use
decisions have not kept pace with the growing complexity and are now
confused. The Supreme Court's landmark land use decision, Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,' took land use regulation to be legislative in nature-
ex ante, generally-applicable, and securing reciprocity of advantage among
citizens within the community. But land use regulation seldom operates
that way now.3 Having had zoning codes in place for many decades, today's
land use planners rarely legislate on a clean slate. Instead, they frequently
make exceptions, amendments, and exemptions in particular cases,4 and
they enter into bilateral agreements with private developers, often with
little or no advance public input.' Not surprisingly, these practices give rise
to widespread corruption, arbitrary decision-making, and sometimes even
outright discrimination.
6
Despite all this, federal and state courts continue to apply 1920s review
standards to twenty-first century land use decisions. Furthermore, courts
generally fail to distinguish between facial and as-applied challenges,
between generally-applicable regulations and individualized assessments,
and between public and private interests.7 Perhaps as a result, lawyers do
not always clearly articulate the grounds on which they challenge land
use decisions. An aggrieved claimant will generally "alleg[e] a myriad of
facts under an undecipherable legal theory."'8 "[O]ften one cannot tell
i Associate Professor of Law, Faulkner University, Jones School of Law; Visiting Fellow,
Princeton University, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, 2012-13.
Thanks to John Garman, Andy Olree, Ashira Pelman Ostrow, and Shelley Ross Saxer for their
helpful comments, and to Jorja Loftin and Jordan Blankenship Davis for their very capable
research assistance. The errors are my own.
z Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 27? U.S. 365 (1926).
3 See Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REv.
591 (2011).
4 Id. at 6oo-o i.
5 Id. at 594.
6 Seeinfra Part III.A.i.
7 Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.zd 716, 722 (s ith Cir. 199o).
8 Romero v. Watson, No. 1:o8 CV 217-SPM-AK, 2009 WL 1361714, at *z (N.D. Fla. May
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which claim has been brought or which standard is being applied."9 As one
United States District Court noted with apparent frustration, "confusion
abounds."' In the face of this confusion, most courts simply adopt a
deferential posture." As a result, land use regulators enjoy broad freedom
to exercise their regulatory discretion in arbitrary ways, untrammeled by
meaningful judicial oversight.
This paper begins with a survey of the current state of judicial review
of land use regulatory decisions. Striking trends emerge from this survey.
For one, though the Supreme Court has provided doctrinal guidance for
distinguishing among various types of challenges to land use decisions,
courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have largely ignored the
guidance.'" Next, though state courts continue to parrot the language of
Village of Euclid, they sometimes in fact depart from Village of Euclid and
review as-applied challenges and appeals from individualized assessments
with heightened scrutiny. 3 Finally, state courts generally fail to articulate
what standard of review they are actually using in such cases; the Village
of Euclid language masks the heightened standard that is doing the work
in those opinions. 14 As a result, no clear doctrine of judicial review has
emerged from the case law.
This muddle obviously poses a threat to landowners, land users, and
their neighbors who cannot count on state-law protection from arbitrary
government actions. Less obviously, it also poses a threat to local
governments, which risk relinquishing their land use authority. Congress has
already legislated in response to arbitrary and abusive land use regulations
in discrete areas.1" Some scholars are calling for expanded national control
of land use regulation,16 while other scholars have suggested that the power
of local governments to engage in master planning be curtailed. 7 Unless
13, 2009).
o Eide, 9o8 F.zd at 72z.
io Romero, zoo9WL 1361714 at *2.
I I See infra Part I1.
12 See infra Part II.C-D.
13 See infra Part II.C-D.
14 See infra Part II.C-D.
15 See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-
2000cc(5) (2oo6 & Supp. IV 2oLo); Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. § 332
(zoo6).
16 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57,98-99 (1999); Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evo-
lution of Properly Rights, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Blake Hudson, Reconsti-
tuting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters, The Bimodal Federal-
ism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 1991 (2o11); Ashira Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
17 See, e.g., REPORT OFTHE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 177-79 (1982); Robert
C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,474-
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states get their local governments under control, these calls are likely to
gain increased support.
This paper suggests a new approach to the problem of judicial review
of land use regulation. When examined closely, the canonical police powers
listed in Village of Euclid suggest that some human goods are proper ends of
land use regulation and that other ends are not valid. The articulation of the
proper goods as ends generally suggests which means are appropriate for
achieving which ends. For these reasons, state legislatures should amend
their enabling acts to require local governments to articulate specific
means-ends justifications for land use decisions. States would do well to
(1) identify which ends are legitimate, substantial, and compelling and (2)
require land use regulators to identify the particular police powers that
they are exercising in each regulatory decision. s
Requiring local governments to articulate specific means-ends
justifications for their decisions that are grounded in intelligible human
goods would force local officials to reason more carefully about, and
explain, their decisions. This would reduce opportunities for favoritism and
arbitrary action. Local officials would be obliged to justify their actions with
reference to particular, rational objectives that are not offered post facto as
arbitrary rationalizations but guide and motivate official action from the
beginning. This process of articulating the community's goals and values
would bring some order and much needed rationality to discretionary land
use decisions.
Meanwhile, by specifying interests of various degrees of importance
and tying those interests to the objective, intelligible goods to which they
correspond, legislatures would enable reviewing courts to perform the
essential means-ends tailoring analysis for which courts are well-suited.
Without intruding upon legislatures' prerogative to articulate community
values, courts could hold local governments accountable to state standards
of decision-making. In other words, courts would be equipped to root out
arbitrary exercises of the police power without resorting to dreaded judicial
activism.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAND-UsE DECISIONS:
EXTENSIVE-BUT-INCONSISTENT DEFERENCE
A. Four Components of Judicial Review
To understand the problem, it is necessary to examine why judicial
review as currently practiced is inadequate. For present purposes, judicial
75 (1977); Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence. A Reconceptualization of Zoning,
43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 6o-6z (1993); Bernard H. Siegan, Conserving and Developing the Land, 27
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 279, 282-83 (1990).
I8 See infra Parts III.C and IV.
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review of a land use regulatory decision can be understood to have four
distinct components or features. Each standard of judicial review consists
of (1) a presumption of validity or invalidity, (2) identification of a state
interest that serves as the end (or purpose, or objective) of the regulation,
(3) review of the nexus between the end and the chosen regulatory means,
and (4) a presumption about the validity or invalidity of the regulator's
factual findings. This is not meant to be an exhaustive taxonomy. Various
courts and scholars identify and arrange the features of judicial review in
very different ways in order to emphasize different operations of judicial
review.19 But for reasons that should become clear, thinking of judicial
review in this way provides a helpful framework for the purposes of this
article.
Each of the components of judicial review works differently in various
types of land use disputes. For illustrative purposes, this article considers
the operation of judicial review primarily in three contexts: facial challenges
to generally applicable regulations, as-applied challenges to generally-
applicable regulations, and as-applied challenges to individualized
assessments. Facial challenges to generally-applicable regulations arise
when a landowner challenges a zoning ordinance or regulation in the
abstract, divorced from a particular development proposal.2 0 As-applied
challenges to generally-applicable regulations arise when the landowner
challenges the application of an ex ante regulation to his own land or
development proposal and that regulation has general application within
some larger zone of the community and can be expected to secure
reciprocity of advantage between some number of land users within the
community.2" As-applied challenges to individualized assessments arise
when a land use decision rests not upon straightforward application of
general rules to a particular parcel but rather upon some discretionary
official act."2 Common individualized assessments include decisions
about conditional use permits, variances, and spot re-zoning.2 3 Finally, for
purposes of comparison the article will also consider reviews of exactions,
19 Compare I ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERIcAN LAW OF ZONING §3 (1986), with David
A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244-53
(1997), Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. Io6i, 1079-80 (2OO8),
Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use
Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1-3 (1992), and Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI.
LEGAL F 53, 53-54 (zoi ). Consider also the articles cited in footnote 5 in Robert J. Hopper-
ton, Standards of Judicial Review in Supreme Court Judicial Opinions: A Taxonomy, An Analytical
Framework, and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. i, 4 n.5 (1997).
20 See, e.g., Napleton v. Vill. of Hinsdale, 872 N.E.2d 23,36 (II1. App. Ct. 2007).
21 See, e.g., Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F3d 159, 164 (3d Cit. 2oo6).
22 Id. at 166.
23 See, e.g., Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals,
325 S.W.2d 324, 326-28 (Ky. 1959); Keogh v. Woodford Cnty. Bd. of Adjustments, 243 S.W.3d
369,370-71 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
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claimed burdens on fundamental constitutional rights, and other unique
judicial review standards.
1. Legal Presumption.-First, each court begins with a legal presumption
that a decision is either presumptively valid or presumptively invalid under
applicable law.14 Exactly what law applies and how the applicable law
affects the legal presumption will vary according to the case. For example,
a land use decision that burdens merely a property right will enjoy a more
deferential presumption than one that burdens both a property right
and a fundamental right, such as speech or religious exercise." Though
these presumptions are rebuttable, the legal presumption with which a
court begins often disposes the issue. Any ambiguity or uncertainty about
who ought to prevail will be resolved in favor of the party that enjoys
the presumption; thus the other party faces the significant challenge of
convincing the court that its proposal is justified.
2. Identification of State Interest.-Second, every standard of judicial review
contains a prong requiring the court to examine the government actor's
purposes or ends.2 6This is the familiar identification of a state interest that is
legitimate, substantial, or compelling. State courts and lower federal courts
tend to be rather reticent to opine on the legitimacy and substantiality of
state interests, with good reason. As will be explained below, this task is
largely one of identifying communal values and is best left to lawmakers.
But state lawmakers (and scholars) have largely ignored this element.
3. Review of Means.-Third, judicial review entails a review of the means
that the government has adopted to achieve its end, and the rationality or
tailoring of the means to the end. 7 This is the familiar analysis of the rational
or substantial relationship, or narrow tailoring, of the regulation to the state
interest. Here courts are on firmer ground and the case law reflects closer
attention to this component. But as this article will demonstrate, courts
take very different approaches to reviewing the ends-means relationship
even in similar cases. And they sometimes use different standards even as
they purport to use uniform standards, and vice versa.
4. Factual Presumption.-Fourth, judicial review involves what might be
called a factual presumption. This includes the burden of proof but also has
other aspects. Who bears the burden of introducing evidence, how much
support the regulatory decision must have in the record, and where the
24 See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 19 (calling attention to the power and operation
of these principles).
25 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
26 Id. at 219-20.
27 Seeid. at 212-14.
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government actors are permitted to look for evidence are all questions that
courts must resolve, either expressly or implicitly, in passing on the validity
of a land use decision.
Land use disputes present many of the same factual and evidentiary
challenges as other civil lawsuits. They are hotly contested by parties with
widely divergent perspectives. They require factual findings based upon
imperfect evidence and facts that point toward more than one possible
inference.
Land use disputes also present additional challenges. Passing judgment
on the efficacy of a land use decision requires extensive speculation about
proposed future actions. Unlike disputes about liability for past actions such
as nuisance and trespass claims, zoning disputes present largely counter-
factual fact questions. A landowner who must overcome the presumption
in favor of the government's "factual" findings might have no way to
demonstrate that the future will not turn out the way the local government
officials predict."8 For all of these reasons the factual presumption pushes
heavily in favor of the party who enjoys it.
B. Facial Challenges to General Enactments-
Dispositive Deference Since Euclid
1. The Foundations of Deference.-In its landmark decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 9 the Supreme Court famously rejected a
facial challenge to a comprehensive land use regulatory scheme. The
Court insisted that, under facial review, any zoning decision that is "fairly
debatable" must be upheld.3 ° Thus,'a claimant could not expect a court to
declare a zoning ordinance unconstitutional unless the relevant provisions
were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."31
Though the Euclid Court allowed for the possibility that some as-
applied challenges might fare better,32 the Court was not inclined to review
28 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Supreme Court
rejected an as-applied challenge to a zoning regulation affecting dredging and excavation.
Id. at 590. Acknowledging that the record contained "a dearth of relevant evidence" on the
questions of (the necessarily speculative) potential harm to the town and potential loss by the
claimant, the Court ruled for the town on the ground that the claimant bore the "burden" on
the question of reasonableness. Id. at 595-96.
29 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
30 Id. at 388.
31 Id. at 395.
32 The Court's discussion of this point, though familiar, is worth quoting at length be-
cause it is so often overlooked or taken for granted.
It is true that when, if ever, the provisions set forth in the ordinance ... come
to be concretely applied to particular premises ... or to particular conditions, or
to be considered in connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even
many of them, may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. But where
[Vol. 1o1
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legislative determinations in gross. Thus, when an action is challenged
facially under Euclid, the governing authority is entitled to every possible
presumption and those presumptions are nearly insuperable. The reviewing
court will not question the reasoning for the zoning decision unless a
specific, inexplicable irrationality is brought to its attention.
2. Protection for Separation ofPowers.-A deferential standard is appropriate
for judicial review of general legislative enactments. As Justice Harlan
noted decades before Euclid in Mugler v. Kansas,33 separation of powers
cannot function if a court is willing to substitute its own judgment for that
of legislators, even as to enactments that destroy the value of a property
or business interest, such as Mugler's brewery.34 Who gets to decide when
a threat to the health or morals of the city justifies coercive state action?
Justice Harlan answered
Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist
somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the few who,
regarding only their own appetites or passions, may be willing to
imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they
are permitted to do so as they please. Under our system that
power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government.
It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the
police powers of the state, and to determine, primarily, what
measures are adopted or needful for the protection of the public
morals, the public health, or the public safety."
That the legislative branch holds this power necessarily entails that the
judicial branch must not interfere with its exercise. This is "a fundamental
principle in our institutions, indispensable to the preservation of public
liberty."3 6 If legislators in Kansas determined that the sale of alcohol
threatened the public morals or health, then the courts should not substitute
their own views of the matter.
37
the equitable remedy of injunction is sought, as it is here, not upon the ground
of a present infringement or denial of a specific right, or of a particular injury in
process of actual execution, but upon 'the broad ground that the mere existence
and threatened enforcement of the ordinance, by materially and adversely affect-
ing values and curtailing the opportunities of the market, constitute a present and
irreparable injury, the court will not scrutinize its provisions, sentence by sentence,
to ascertain by a process of piecemeal dissection whether there may be, here and
there, provisions of a minor character, or relating to matters of administration, or
not shown to contribute to the injury complained of, which, if attacked separately,
might not withstand the test of constitutionality.
Id. at 395-96. As this passage demonstrates, it should matter what lype of challenge the land-
owner brings.
33 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34 Id. at 660.
35 Id. at 66o-6i.
36 Id. at 662.
37 Id. State courts and lower federal courts have followed Justice Harlan's lead on this
point. "This judicial deference to legislative discretion in the enactment of laws, zoning or
2012-20131
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The lesson to be gleaned from Euclid and Mugler is that legislatures
exercise the police powers because the community articulates and defends
its objectives-its goals and values-through its democratic institutions.
Promulgation entails identification of both abstract and particular ends and
adoption of regulatory means that are reasonably aimed toward those ends.
Judgment by a court, by contrast, entails review of a specific factual history,
identification of an enforceable right of obligation, and a finding that one
party has failed to conform his conduct or proposal to what the law requires.
By limiting courts to the latter function, deferential standards of review
secure the legislative role against judicial usurpation.
38
The Eleventh Circuit explained how judicial deference works in
the land use context. "Federal courts do not sit as zoning boards of
appeals .... ,,39 Updating the claims that are available to a landowner under
extant law, the court noted, "[i]nsofar as the Constitution is concerned, a
municipal government may control the use of land within its jurisdiction
for what it perceives to be the common good, subject only to four
restrictions."'  The four types of constitutional claims that a landowner
may use to challenge regulation of its land are: (1) a just compensation
claim under the Takings Clause; (2) a regulatory takings claim; (3) a claim
of arbitrary or capricious regulation under principles of substantive due
otherwise, is a cornerstone of the doctrine of separation of powers." Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 1179, 118z (La. Ct. App. 1981). Courts are particularly reticent to pass
judgment on the rationality of the government's ends, or objectives. An early decision in Ken-
tucky explained:
The police power rests in the Legislature of the state, and no subdivision of the
state may exercise that power except through a grant made by the people of the
state through its legislative branch. Police power cannot well be defined. The state
employs it for fire protection, sanitary regulations, and for preventing the spread
of epidemics. Fireproof requirements, regulations of plumbing, tenement houses,
and construction requirements are but other illustrations of what we denominate
the police power of the state.
Fowler v. Obier, 7 S.W.zd 219, 223 (Ky. 1928); see also Burritt v. Harris, 166 So. 2d 168, 173
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, 185 So.2d 278, 281-82 (La. Ct.
App. 1966); Blacklidge v. City of Gulfport, 223 So.2d 530, 532-34 (Miss. 1969); and the cases
discussed infra Part II.B.3.
38 It is not clear to what extent judicial deference results from the Euclid decision itself,
as opposed to subsequent interpretations of Euclid, which read the case in light of later de-
velopments in the law of economic substantive due process. Euclid was decided after Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and was followed closely by the Court's decision in Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), discussed infra Part C, in which the Court struck down
a zoning ordinance in an as-applied challenge. But since West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937) the Supreme Court has adhered closely to Justice Harlan's admonition that courts
should defer to states' exercises of the police power. Perhaps in this light, state courts and
lower federal courts have viewed Euclid's deferential posture as illustrative of the Court's
deference to exercises of the police powers generally.
39 Mackenzie v. City of Rockledge, 92o F.2d 1554, 1558 (1 Ith Cir. 1991).
40 Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1373 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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process; and (4) a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 41 Subject only
to these limitations, "the Constitution does not prevent a local government
from restricting, controlling, or limiting the development of land to promote
what it perceives to be the general welfare interests of the community as
a whole.142 In short, unless the government has taken title to the land or
has violated equal protection, the Due Process Clause will control. And
the Due Process Clause requires courts to defer to rational exercises of the
police power.
3. Widespread Use in State Courts.-Not surprisingly, the Euclid standard
of review predominates among both federal43 and state courts.' Whether
41 Id. at 1374.
42 Id.
43 Following Euclid, the Supreme Court re-affirmed its deferential stance in Zahn v. Bd
of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) and Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). See also, e.g., Triomphe
Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1995); Mackenzie, 920 Fad at 1558-
59; Jackson Court Condos., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1O7O, 1074 (5th Cir. 1989).
44 Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 173 So. 2d 67, 70 (Ala. 1963); Hart v. Bayless Inv. &
Trading Co., 346 P.2d Io, 1105 (Ariz. 196o); City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park,
Inc., 916 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Ark. 1996); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder v. Echternacht, 572 Pad
143, 146 (Colo. 1977); Poneleit v. Dudas, io6 A.2d 479,481 (Conn. 1954); City of Miami Beach
v. Lachman, 71 So. ad 148, 150 (Fla. 1953); Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City of Honolulu, 767 P.2d
815, 820 (Haw. 1989); Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine Cnty., 567 Pad 1257, 1262 (Idaho 1977);
Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 1 15,
1i8 (Ind. 1954); Hardy v. Mayor of Eunice, 348 So.2d 143, 148 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Penobscot
Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.ad 14, 23 (Me. i981); Mayor of Annapolis v.
Annapolis Waterfront Co., 396 A.ad io8o, IO87 (Md. 1979); Caires v. Bldg. Comm'r of Hing-
ham, 83 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Mass. 1949); Fass v. City of Highland Park, 32 N.W.ad 375, 377
(Mich. 1948); Concept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 815 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005); Mayor of Clinton v. Hudson, 774 So.2d 448, 451 (Miss. Ct. App. 2ooo); Treme v.
St. Louis Cnty., 609 S.W.2d 706, 713-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 198o); Mack T. Anderson Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. City of Belgrade, 803 P.ad 648, 65o-51 (Mont. 199o); City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 39
N.W.ad 828, 834-35 (Neb. 1949); Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 795 A.2d 290,
294-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. aooa); Dugger v. City of Santa Fe, 834 P.2d 424, 430 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992); Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951); Kinney v. Sut-
ton, 53 S.E.ad 306, 310 (N.C. 1949); City of Minot v. Cent. Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.d 851,
858 (N.D. 1981); Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.ad 258, 271-72 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1979); Clary v. Okla. City, 532 P.ad 1383, 1384 (Okla. 1975); Page v. City of Portland,
I65 Pad 28o, 282-83 (Or. 1946); Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 460 A.2d io88, io89 (Pa.
1983); Camara v. City of Warwick, 358 A.2d 23,30-31 (R.I. 1976); Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd.
of Adjustment, 72 S.E.2d 66, 68-70 (S.C. 1952); Tillo v. City of Sioux Falls, 147 N.W.ad 128,
130 (S.D. 1966); Davidson Cnty. v. Rogers, 198 S.W.ad 812, 814-15 (Tenn. 1947); City of Waxa-
hachie v. Watkins, 275 S.W.ad 477, 48o-81 (Tex. 1955); Bell v. City of Waco, 835 S.W.2d 211,
214 (Tex. App. 1992); Gayland v. Salt Lake Cnty., 358 P2d 633, 636 (Utah i961); Galanes v.
Town of Brattleboro, 388 A.2d 406,409-10 (Vt. 1978); Bd. of Cnty. Sup'rs v. Carper, 107 S.E.ad
390, 395 (Va. 1959); McNaughton v. Boeing, 414 P.ad 778, 780 (Wash. 1966); Carter v. City of
Bluefield, 54 S.E.2d 747, 760 (W. Va. j949); Buhler v. Racine Cnty., 146 N.W2d 403,407-08
(Wis. 1966); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P2d 717, 727 (Wyo. 1985).
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referred to as a "fairly debatable," 4 "arbitrary and capricious," 46 "abuse
of discretion, ' 47 "substantial relation,"' "reasonable relation(ship),"49
"reasonable basis, 5 0 or "rational basis"51 test, this standard of review
operates the same way."2 The land use decision is presumed to be both
45 Homewood Citizens Ass'n v. City of Homewood, 548 So. 2d 142, 143 (Ala. 1989) (cit-
ing 8z Am. Jur. zd Zoning and Planning § 338 (1976)); McCormick v. City of Pensacola, 2 16 So.
2d 785, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Dawson Enters., Inc., 567 P.2d at 1262-63; E & G Enters.
v. City of Mount Vernon, 373 N.W.2d 693, 694'(Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Golden v. City of Over-
land Park, 584 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Kan. 1978) (quoting Gaslight Villas, Inc. v. City of Lansing,
518 P.2d 410, 414 (Kan. 1974)); Annapolis Waterfront Co., 396 A.2d at 1o87; Rodgers, 96 N.E.2d
a; 733 (quoting, in part, Shepard v. Vill. of Skaneateles, 89 N.E.zd 619, 6zo (N.Y. 1949)); seealso
Dings v. Phillips, 701 P.2d 961, 963 (Kan. 1985).
46 Mackenzie, 92o E2d at 1558- 59 (citing Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 E2d 256, 258 (1 th
Cir. 1989)); Homewood Citizens Ass'n, 548 So. 2d at 143; Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.2d 760, 769
(Del. 1988); E & G Enters., 373 N.W.zd at 649; McNaughton, 414 P.2d at 780 (quoting Lillions v.
Gibbs, 289 P.2d 203, 205 (Wash. 1955)).
47 City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian Sch., Inc., 642 S.E.2d 824, 825 (Ga. 2007)
(quoting Gwinnett Cnty. v. Ehler Enters., 5tz S.E.2d 239 (Ga. 1999)); Inc. City of Denison v.
Clabaugh, 306 N.W.2d 748, 755 (Iowa 198i) (internal citation omitted); Hardy, '348 So. 2d at
148; McKenzie v. Shelly, 362 P.zd 268, 270 (Nev. 1961) (citing Keller v. City of Council Bluffs,
66 N.W.zd 113, 1I6 (Iowa 1954)).
48 E & G Enters., 373 N.W.2d at 694 (quoting Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168
N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969)); Bosworth v. City of Lexington, 125 S.W.2d 995, 1oo (Ky. 1939)
(internal quotation omitted); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (La. Ct.
App. 1981) (citing 'West v. City of Lake Charles, 375 So. 2d 2o6, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1979)); City
of Brewer, 434 A.2d at z3; Glissmann, 39 N.W.2d at 835 (quoting Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 47
S.W.zd 495,497 (Tex. App. 1932)).
49 Lum Yip Kee, Ltd., 767 P.2d at 822 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365,395 (1926)); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 15 (N.M. 1964).
50 Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Bd. of Adjustment and Appeals, 904
P2d 373, 379 n.z3 (Alaska 1995).
51 Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, ioI9 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Concerned
Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula, 527 P.ad 447, 452 (Alaska 1974)); City of
Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 9i6 S.W.2d 95,98 (Ark. 1996) (citing City of Bates-
ville v. Grace, 534 S.W.2d 224 (Ark. 1976)); Elkhart Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Earthmov-
ers, Inc., 631 N.E.zd 927, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Newman v. Spence, 565 N.E.zd 350, 353
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Concept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804,815 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
52 But see Hall v. Jefferson Cnty., 450 So. zd 792, 796 (Ala. 1984) ("The 'fairly debatable'
standard is a rule of procedure or application" and does not excuse the zoning authority from
substantively grounding its decision in a "reasonable and substantial relationship to the pro-
motion of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"); City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas
Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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legally legitimate5" and factually supported by the evidence,54 and the
reviewing court defers to both the local government's statement of
purpose and the means chosen to protect that state interest, unless some
irrationality, which is inexplicable on the record, unambiguously presents
itself."5 In cases that employ Euclid-type deference, landowners receive
little protection. 6
53 Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 173 So. 2d 67, 70 (Ala. 1963) (internal citation omit-
ted); Griswold, 925 Pad at io19 (quoting Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula, 527 P.2d at
452); M &NMobile Home Park, Inc., 916 S.W.2d at98 (citing City of Little Rock v. Breeding,
619 S.W.2d 664 (Ark. 198I)); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder v. Echternacht, 572 P.2d 143,
146 (Colo. 1977); Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.ad 760, 769 (Del. 1988); McCormick v. City of
Pensacola, 216 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (quoting Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d
820 (Fla. 1965)) (explaining that the fairly debatable standard requires courts to affirm when
for any reason the challenged regulation "is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that
make sense or point to a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity");
Dings v. Phillips, 701 P.ad 961, 963 (Kan. 1985) (quoting Combined Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Butler
Cnty. Comm'rs, 605 P.ad 533, 541 (Kan. I98O)); Bosworth, 125 S.W.2d at IooO; Warren v. Mun.
Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624, 627-28 (Me. 1981) (citing City of Saco v. Tweeding, 314
A.2d 135, 136 (Me. 1974)); Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 46o A.2d io88, IO89 (Pa. 1983);
Camara v. City of Warwick, 358 A.2d 23, 30-31 (R.I. 1976).
54 Grayson, 173 So. 2d at 70-71; Griswold, 925 P.ad at 1019 (quoting Concerned Citizens of
S. Kinai Peninsula, 527 Pad at 452); McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 183 A.2d 572, 578 (Del. 1962)
(citing Kozesnik v. Twp. pf Montgomery, 131 A.2d i (N.J. 1957)); Granger v. Bd. of Adjustment
of Des Moines, 44 N.W.2d 399,403 (Iowa 195o); E & G Enters. v. City of Mount Vernon, 373
N.W.2d 693,694 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, i68 N.W.2d
739, 742 (Iowa 1969)); Dings, 701 P2d at 963 (quoting Combinedlnv. Co., 605 P.2d at 541); Her-
nandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 1179, i 8o (La. Ct. App. 1981); Meyers v. City of Baton
Rouge, 185 So. 2d 278, 282 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (internal quotation omitted); Warren, 431 A.2d
at 628 (citing City of Saco, 314 A.ad at 136); Nw. Builders, Inc. v. Moore, 475 So. 2d 153, 156
(Miss. 1985); McKenzie v. Shelly, 362 P.ad 268, 270 (Nev. 1961) (internal citations omitted).
55 In the words of one court, the irrationality must be "plain and palpable." Meyers, 185
So. 2d at 282; see also Grayson, 173 So. ad at 70 (stating that courts will defer to local govern-
ment's enactment unless "invalid or obnoxious"); McQuail, 183 A.ad at 578 (stating action will
be upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion); McCormick, 2 16 So. 2d at 789 (citing City of
Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So. ad 493 (Fla. 1953)) (stating doubt of ordinance's validity should
be resolved in favor of ordinance); E & G Enters., 373 N.W.ad at 694 (quoting Anderson, 168
N.W.ad at 742) (stating ordinance will not be stricken down unless shown to be clearly arbi-
trary); Dings, 701 P.ad at 963 (quoting Comhinedlnv. Co., 605 Pad at 541) (stating court will not
strike down act "unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence"); Hardy v. Mayor of Eu-
nice, 348 So.2d 143, 148 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (internal citation omitted) (stating that the court
will uphold action unless there is an excessive use of power); City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 39
N.W.ad 828, 835 (Neb. 1949) (quoting Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 13 N.W.ad 634
(Neb. 1944)) (stating abuse of discretion must be clearly shown for court to intervene).
56 Florida briefly employed a more rigorous review standard, but later abandoned it.
The Florida Supreme Court discussed its "fairly debatable" standard at some length in City of
Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953) ("An ordinance may be said to be fairly
debatable when for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense
or point to a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity."). Then, in
Burrittv. Harris, 166 So. ad 168, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) [ hereinafter BurrittI], in the course
of upholding a zoning board decision, the court of appeal indicated that the burden might
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C. As-Applied Challenges to General Enactments-
The Lawful End Requirement
That a general zoning enactment. is valid on its face does not entail
that it is valid as applied to a particular landowner.57 As-applied challenges
to land use regulations sometimes prompt more exacting review." The
Supreme Court laid the doctrinal foundation for heightened scrutiny shortly
after it handed down the Euclid decision, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.s9
Significantly, the Supreme Court used the language of deferential review;
60
however, as applied to Nectow the ordinance was examined rather closely.
61
Rather than presume a legitimate state interest, the Court searched the
record and failed to discern "any reason" for the zoning decision with
respect to Nectow's tract.62 The zoning decision deprived Nectow of his
property in violation of the Due Process Clause. 63 The Nectow Court thus
created a precedent for heightened scrutiny, a skeptical review of the
lawfulness of the local government's asserted ends.
The most remarkable thing about the Nectow ruling is how seldom it
appears in subsequent decisions resolving as-applied challenges. Even
rest upon the local government to justify any land use regulations that "deprive a person of
his property without due process." Id. at 172-73 (internal citation omitted). The Florida Su-
preme Court reversed, and expressly ruled that the municipality had "not established" that
the zoning action "bears substantially on the public health, morals, safety or welfare of the
community." Buritt, 172 So. zd at 8zz [hereinafter Burrit 11].
Citing this authority, an intermediate Florida appellate court in Lawleyv. Town of Gulview,
174 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) noted that the Bufitt H court had introduced an
"innovation in the zoning law of Florida by casting on the zoning authority the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the zoning restrictions under attack 'bear
substantially' on [a public interest]." Id. at 770. Other courts appear to have shared this under-
standing. See City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 208 So. 2d 268, 270, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
In 1968, the Florida Supreme Court insisted that its Burritt II decision had been wrongly con-
strued, and that the fairly debatable standard, taken from Euclid, had been the law all along.
City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. zd 315, 316 (Fla. 1968). As a result, the "fairly debatable
doctrine is now restored" in Florida law. McCormick, z 6 So. 2d at 789.
57 "Although a zoning ordinance may be valid in its general aspects, it may nevertheless
be invalid as applied to particular piece of property or a particular set of facts." Ziman v. Vill.
of Glencoe, 275 N.E.zd 168, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (citing Joseph Lumber Co. v. City of Chi.,
83 N.E.2d 592 (Ill. 1949)).
58 Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLU-
IPA, 31 H~a.v. J.L. & PuB. PO'v. 717, 755-59 (2008) [hereinafter, Lessons from RLUIPA].
59 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
60 Id. at 187-88 (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
61 This inconsistency between what the Court claimed to be doing and the review that
it actually exercised is mirrored in the practices of state and lower federal courts. See infra Part
II.C-D.
62 Nectow, 277 U.S. at t88. The master had found as a matter of fact that the zoning deci-
sion did not promote any lawful end. That fact-finding determined the outcome of the case.
63 Id. at 188-89.
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when claimants bring as-applied challenges to specific provisions of
zoning regulations, courts generally invoke the Euclid standard' and look
no further than the local government's asserted interest and rationale.65 In
64 Bell v. City of Waco, 835 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App. 1992) (stating that Euclid defer-
ence applies whether ordinance is challenged "generally or as to particular property"); see also
La Salle Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. City of Chi., 125 N.E.ad 609, 612 (Il1. 1955) (stating "reasonable
relation" standard of review applies for a particular property); Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Wabaunsee Cnty., 2i8 P.3d 400, 413 (Kan. 2009) (quoting Combined Inv. Co.
v. Bd. of Butler Cnty. Comm'rs, 605 P.ad 533, 541 (Kan. 198o)) (stating need to determine
if act is reasonable as applied to a particular property); Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584
P.ad 130, 134-35 (Kan. 1978) (stating need to determine if action is arbitrary with regard to a
particular property); Bourbon Country Estates, Inc. v. St. James Parish, 611 So. ad 18o, 182-83
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (internal citation omitted) (stating that as applied challenges to a particular
property are subject to arbitrary standard of review); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So.
2d 1179, 1 181-82 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434
A.ad 14, 23 (Me. 1981) (citing Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.ad 741, 744 (Me. 1974))
(stating that appropriate standard of review is "substantial relation"); Wright v. Michaud, 200
A.ad 543, 547 (Me. 1964)) (stating as applied challenges to ordinance is subject to "substantial
relation" test); Caires v. Bldg. Comm'r of Hingham, 83 N.E.ad 550, 553 (Mass. 1949); Fass
v. City of Highland Park, 32 N.W.ad 375, 377 (Mich. 1948) (citing Harrigan & Reid Co. v.
Burton, 195 N.W. 60 (Mich. 1923)) (stating ordinance stands in an as applied challenge unless
there is "competent evidence" to the contrary); Mack T Anderson Ins. Agency, Inc. v. City of
Belgrade, 803 P.ad 648, 65o-51 (Mont. 199o) (stating that an as applied challenge of a zoning
ordinance is subject to Euclid standard); City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 39 N.W. ad 828, 834-36
(Neb. 1949) (stating that as applied challenges are subject to Euclid standard of review); Rum-
son Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 795 A.ad 290, 294-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(quoting Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 538 A.ad 8o8 (N.J. 1988)) (stating that as applied chal-
lenges are subject to "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review); Dugger v. City of Santa
Fe, 834 P.ad 424, 430 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that as applied challenges are subject to
"reasonable relation" standard of review); Kinney v. Sutton, 53 S.E.ad 306, 31o (N.C. 1949);
Soderfelt v. City of Drayton, 59 N.W.ad 502, 507 (N.D. 1953) (stating that as applied chal-
lenges are subject to "fairly debatable" standard); Clary v. Okla. City, 532 P.ad 1383, 1384-85
(Okla. 1975) (citing McNair v. Okla. City, 490 P.ad 1364, 1367 (Okla. 1971); City of Tulsa v.
Mobley, 454 P.ad 9oi (Okla. 1969)) (stating as applied challenges are subject to "fairly debat-
able" standard of review); Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 460 A.2d io88, 1o89 (Pa. 1983)
(stating that as applied challenges are subject to "substantial relationship" standard); Rush
v. City of Greenville, 143 S.E.ad 527, 531 (S.C. 1965) (stating that as applied challenges are
subject to "arbitrary, unreasonable, or... obvious abuse of... discretion" standard of review);
Davidson Cnty. v. Rogers, 198 SW.ad 812, 814-15 (Tenn. 1947) (stating as applied challenges
are subject to Euclidstandard of review); Galanes v.Town of Brattleboro, 3 88A.2d 406,409-10
(Vt. 1978) (stating that as applied challenges are subject to "reasonable relation" standard of
review); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.ad 717,727 (Wyo. 1985) (stating that as applied
challenges are subject to "reasonable basis" standard of review).
65 Flippen Alliance for Cmty. Empowerment, Inc. v. Brannan, 6oi S.E.2d 1o6, i i i (Ga.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Corey Outdoor Adver. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 327 S.E.2d 178
(Ga. 1985)); City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 685 Pad 8a1, 824-25 (Idaho 1984); City of Denison
v. Clabaugh, 306 N.W.ad 748, 755-56 (Iowa 1981); E & G Enters. v. City of Mount Vernon,
373 N.W.zd 693,694-95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Dings v. Phillips, 701 P.ad 961, 965 (Kan. 1985);
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 17-18 (N.M. 1964); City of Brookings
v. Winker, 554 N.W.zd 827, 831 (S.D. 1996). ButseeZiman v. Vill. of Glencoe, 275 N.E.2d 168,
172 (I11. App. Ct. 1971); Plaza Recreational Ctr. v. Sioux City, i ii N.W.ad 758, 765 (Iowa i96I)
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such cases, the local government enjoys all favorable presumptions and the
claimant bears correspondingly high burdens of proof and persuasion.
66
Indeed, in reviewing as-applied challenges during the decades after
Nectow, the Supreme Court itself granted presumptions of legal and factual
validity to regulators and placed the burdens of proof and persuasion on
the claimants.
6'
One possible explanation for this neglect of Nectow is that, since West
Coast Hotelss and Carolene Products,69 courts simply are reticent to substitute
their own judgments for legislative determinations when reviewing
economic regulations and other burdens on property. 0 But another
interpretation of events also presents itself: The Euclid and Nectow Courts
took pains to distinguish the facial challenge asserted in Euclid from the'
as-applied challenge in Nectow; unlike Nectow, Ambler Realty had made
no specific land use proposals when it brought its claim against the City
of Euclid and its tract was then vacant." In contrast, the vast majority of
state court decisions draw no distinctions between facial and as-applied
challenges to zoning regulations."
Some lower courts have suggested that Nectow might have life, 3 that
as-applied challenges to general enactments might be entitled to slightly
more attention than facial challenges, particularly as to the government's
objective. 4 Though these courts seldom explain why they are employing
.(internal citation omitted).
66 Flippen Alliance, 6oi S.E.2d at o9-b; Plaza Recreational Ctr, i i N.W.zd at 762-63;
Clabaugh, 306 N.W.2d at 755-56; Dings, 701 P.2d at 965; Hernandez, 399 So. 2d at 118o-83; City
of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.zd 773, 778-79 (Tex. 1972).
67 Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 7-8 (1974) (internal citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 594 (1962).
68 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)-
69 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
70 I am grateful to Andy Olree for raising this possibility.
71 Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co:, 272 U.S. 365,384-85 (1926).
72 Lessons from RLUIPA, supra note 58, at 759.
73 See Goldberg Cos. v. Council of Richmond Heights, 69o N.E.2d 510,512 (Ohio 1998)
(quoting Nectow "v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 188 (1928)).
74 Simi Inv. Co., v. Harris Cnty., 236 F3d 240, 251, 253 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no "ratio-
nal basis" for county's decision); City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 159
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (employing presumption of validity but affirming trial court's ruling
that zoning action was unconstitutional); Henry Cnty. v. Tim Jones Prop., Inc., 539 S.E.2d 167,
168, 170 (Ga. 2000) (finding that the landowner met burden of presenting "clear and convinc-
ing evidence to rebut the presumption that the zoning classification is constitutional"); City
of McDonough v. Tusk Pattners, 492 S.E.ad zo6, zo8-o9 (Ga. t997) (holding the trial court
did not clearly err by finding, based on conflicting evidence, that zoning designation was "un-
substantially related to the public health, safety and welfare"); City of Atlanta v. Standish, 353
S.E.2d 489, 491 (Ga. 1987) (using "clearly erroneous" standard but overturning city's refusal
to rezone); Ziman v. Vill. of Glencoe, 275 N.E.2d 168, 171 (I11. App. Ct. 1971) ("Although a
zoning ordinance may be valid in its general aspects, it may nevertheless be invalid as applied
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heightened lawful-end scrutiny, it appears that they are largely concerned
about arbitrariness in the ends that local governments have chosen to
pursue."5 In particular, they seem worried that land use regulators are acting
to promote primarily private interests rather than promoting the common
good. of the community.
7 6
Other courts also have taken a skeptical view of the lawfulness,
authenticity, or rationality of municipalities' asserted objectives when
reviewing as-applied challenges, even as they have purported to exercise
"fairly-debatable" review.77 These decisions demonstrate that, like the
to a-particular piece of property or a particular set of facts."); E & G Enters. v. City of Mount
Vernon, 373 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (Hayden, J. dissenting); Christine Bldg.
Co. y. City of Troy, 16 N.W,2d 8t6, 821 (Mich. 1962); Eagle Grp. of Princetonv. Zoning Bd.
Of Adjustment, 644 A.zd 1115, 112O-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994j; Los-Green, Inc. v.
Weber, 156A.D.2d 994,994 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Mahony v. Twp. of Hampton, 651 A.2d 525,
526-28 (Pa. 1994) (employing "rational relationship" standard and presumption of validity,
but finding that Township's prohibition against private natural gas wells "bears no real and
substantial relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the community"); Carter v. City, of
Biuefield, 54 S.E.zd 747, 762 (W. Va. 1949).
75 See, e.g., Simi Inv. Co., v. Harris Cnty., 236 F3d 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the
district court's finding that the County acted on "an illegitimate plan to benefit the private
interests of" a neighboring landowner; ruling that the County "acted arbitraril'...and, thus,
without a rational basis").
76 For example, the Delaware Superior Court sustained an as-applied challenge to an
ordinance prohibiting the construction of a filling station within 200 feet of any other tract
that already contained a filling station. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 283 A.zd 837,838
(Del. Super. Ct. 197 1). The court insisted that zoning authorities enjoy "wide and liberal dis-
cretion," and their decisions can be overturned only if the claimant meets its burden of show-
ing the decision to be "arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 839. Yet the court did not credit the
town's asserted justification, that it was concerned about "traffic problems and the danger of
fire and explosions." Id. The court found the town's justification "difficult to understand," and
speculated that the ordinance was enacted to protect the economic interests of established gas
station owners, an objective that did not serve "the public interest." Id.
77 Simi Invest. Co., 236 E3d at 251, 254 (affirming trial court's finding that a bitrary deci-
sion by County constituted "an illegitimate plan to benefit the private interests of [neigh-
boring landowners, who also occupied positions of'power in the County] whose properties
were financially benefitted by" the decision);-Tira Jones Prop., Inc., 539 S.E.2d at 170 (finding
County produced no evidence of "public benefit" from its zoning decision); Tusk Partners, 492
S.E.2d at 208-09; Standish, 353 S.E:2d at 491 (finding insufficient "public benefit" from the
zoning decision);Tillitson v. City of Urbana, 193 N.E.2d 1, 4 (I1l. 1963); La Salle Nat. Bank of
Chic. v. City of Chi., 125 N.E.2d 609, 612-13 (Ill. 1955) (applying a fairly debatable standard,
but as applied to claimant's land on heavily trafficked street in Chicago, zoning ordinance
amendment lowering allowed heights of apartment buildings in the zone was unreasonable
and arbitrary); Ziman, 275 N.E.2d at 171; Golden v. Cit of Overland Park, 584 P2d 130, 134,
137-38 (Kan. 1978) (using fairly-debatable standard, but finding city's refusal to re-zone tract
unreasonable; decision left landowner with no economically feasible use, and officials pro-
vided teasons for their decision only after the fact); Los-Green, Inc., 156 A.D.zd at 994 (stat-
ing the purpose of the comprehensive plan requirement, which town violated, is to "ensure
that the [zoning] amendment is calctlated to benefit the entire community, not individual or
special interests"); Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 271-77 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1979).
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Supreme Court, lower courts sometimes tend -to doubt that the land use
regulatory powers are being exercised reasonably, for a common good.
78
Because these courts recite the standard of deferential review passed
down to them from the Euclid Court, they do not explain their heightened
scrutiny of local government objectives but they scrutinize the objectives
just the same.
In Illinois and Kansas the state supreme courts have enumerated
particular factors that must be considered when reviewing as-applied
challenges to land use decisions.7 9 The Kansas court has stressed that
judicial review will be more uniform and effective if land use officials state
the ultimate reasons on which their decisions are based." "Reviewing
courts, then, will have a record to review and act upon."81 Enumeration
of permissible objectives thus facilitates the type of lawful-erid review
modeled in Nectow.
D. Individualized Assessments-Second Order
Rational Basis Review (Sometimes)
1. The Problem: Unfettered Discretion.-As noted above, a fundamental
principle of constitutional governance holds that courts should not
78 The common good consists of plural (but not infinitely plural) human goods in the
instantiation of which humans participate individually and cooperatively, and which accrue
to the benefit of all. It is not quantified in a utilitarian sense as the greatest aggregate of indi-
vidual values or preferences for the greatest number. See'infra Part III.C. i-2.
79 In Illinois the factors are:
(i) The existing uses and zoning of nearby property, (2) the extent to which prop-
erty values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions, (3) the extent to
which the destruction of property values of plaintiff promotes the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the public, (4) the relative gain to the public as com-
pared to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner, (5) the suit-
ability of the subject property for the zoned purposes, and (6) the length of time
the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the context of Iand develop-
ment in the area in the vicinity of the subject property.
La Salle Nat'l. Bank v. City of Evanston, 312 N.E.ad 625, 632 (i11. 1974).
In Kansas the primary factors are:
() The character of the neighborhood; (2) the zoning and uses of properties near-
by; (3) the suitability of the subject property for the uses to which it has been
restricted; (4) the extent to which removal of the restrictions will detrimentally
affect nearby property; (5) the length of time the subject property has remained
vacant as zoned; and (6) the relative gain to the public health, safety, and welfare
by the destruction of the value of plaintiff's" property as compared to the hardship
imposed upon the individual landowner.
Golden, 584 P.ad at 136. Additional factors include recommendations of professional staff, con-
formance to the master plan, and, significantly, any additional factors that the state legislature
might enumerate. Id.
8o Golden, 584 P.2d at 137.
81 Id. See generally Michael J. Davis, Survey of Kansas Law: Real Property, 41 KAN. L. REV.
669, 68o-683 (1993) (reviewing Kansas land use cases decided in the wake of Golden).
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usurp legislative actions whenever those actions have some intelligible
grounding in a lawful, public, legitimate end. But what if some land use
decisions represent not the considered judgment of those who live within
the community, acting through their elected representatives, but rather
the raw exercise of bureaucratic discretion? What if that discretion is not
guided by ex ante rules, and is instead exercised on a case-by-case basis?
A land use regulator who is authorized to make such discretionary decisions
actually poses a threat to the separation of powers. He or she combines the
legislative and judicial powers in one office. When a reviewing court defers
to the discretionary decision of such an official, as happens in deferential
judicial review of an individualized assessment, that court becomes
complicit in the arrogation of power.
Equally troubling is the freedom that land use regulators have to choose
among values when discretionary decisions are entrusted to them. Under
rational basis review, the legislature decides what interests the state will
pursue and the reviewing court defers to the official's determination that
the chosen interest is legitimate. In theory, this feature of judicial review
ought to serve the separation of powers by leaving to local governments
the legislative task of determining what ends the community values. But
in practice, objectives are selected not through the democratic means
appropriate to legislative choices but rather through discretionary official
actions. There is thus no guarantee that the resulting decision reflects
or represents the values of the community. Though judicial deference
regarding the legitimacy of an asserted interest is justifiable as a mechanism
for separating legislative powers from judicial powers, in a regime of
discretionary land use decisions, it can actually enable land use regulators
to amass and consolidate those powers.
Because not all land use regulatory action is ex ante, prospective,
democratic, and generally-applicable,2 many land use decisions, especially
individualized assessments, are prone toward arbitrariness." For this
reason, despite continuing to use the language of judicial deference, some
courts are deferring less. As Mandelker and Tarlock have observed, judicial
deference to certain types of land use decisions has eroded as courts have
awakened to the arbitrary nature of many of these decisions' and have
sought to ensure "more open and considered decisions.""5
2. The Solution: Second-Order Rational Basis Review.-Some state courts
have reviewed individualized assessments with a heightened degree of
82 Leavitt v. Jefferson Cnty., 875 P.2d 68I, 684-86 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing dif-
ferences between enactment of a "county-wide development code of general and prospective
application," which is a legislative function, and zoning actions that affect particular tracts).
83 Id. at 686.
84 Mandelker and Tarlock, supra note I9, at 5-6.
85 Id. at 2.
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rigor,86 even as they have parroted the deferential language of Euclid.87
Though they have not been explicit about it, these courts often use what
might be considered second-order rational basis scrutiny. Some common
features emerge from these decisions. Many states treat individualized
determinations as if they were administrative decisions.88 Though at least
one of these states authorizes courts to conduct de novo review,89 most of
them require review for abuse of discretion.' They review fact findings for
clear error t and review legal conclusions for arbitrariness.Z Among other
86 W. Paving Const. Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder, 506 P.ad 1230, 1231-32
(Colo. 1973); Keating v. Patterson, 43 A.2d 659 (Conn. 1954); North Bay Viii. v. Blackwell,
Fla., 88 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 1956); People ex rel. Schimpffv. Norvell, 13 N.E.zd 960, 961 (III.
1938); City of Watseka v. Blatt, 50 N.E.2d 589, 593 (II1. Ct. App. 1943); Chi., Rock Island &
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Liddle, 1iz N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1962) (citing Cent. States Theatre Corp. v.
Sar,66 N.W.2d 450, 454-55 (Iowa 1954); City of Richmond v. House, 188 S.W.2d z18, z19-zo
(Ky. 1917); Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 75 N.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Mich. 1956); Hagerstown v.
Baltimore & O.R. Co., 68 A. 490, 493 (Md. 19o8)); Town of Prentiss v. Jefferson Davis Cnty.,
874 So. 2d 962,964-66 (Miss. 2004); Hinds Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Leggette, 833 So.2d 586,
590-92 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); Gullickson v. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 474 N.W.d 890,
89z--94 (N.D. x99x); Kotpi v. Town of Peterborough, 599 A.zd 13o, 131 (N.H. t991); State ex
rel. Ohio Oil Co. v. City of Defiance, 133 N.E.zd 392, 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
87 See, e.g., Newman v. Spence, 565 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Four States
Realty Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So.2d 659, 672 (La. 1974).
88 Luper v. City of Wasilla, 215 P.3d 342, 345 (Alaska 2oo9); Sowin Assocs. v. Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, 580 A.2d 91, 93 (Conn. App. Ct. I99O); Hearne v. City of Brookhaven,
822 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of
Albuquerque, 184 P.3d 411, 421-22 (N.M. 2008).
89 Arkansas authorizes courts to conduct de novo review of "administrative" and "quasi-
judicial" land use decisions, ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (1998), which are ministerial deci-
sions, in which the land use regulator exercises little or no discretion. Buckley W. Bridges,
2oo: A Second Odyssey Into Arkansas Land-Use Law, 33 U. ARK. LiTrL ROCK L. REV. 9, 28-30
(zolO). Unsurprisingly, the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial decisions,
on the one hand, and "legislative" land use decisions, on'the other, is of first importance in Ar-
kansas. Id. at 36. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently decided that issuance of a conditional
use permit is a quasi-judicial action, and is therefore subject to de novo review. King's Ranch
of Jonesboro, Inc. v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. 123, at 6 (Ark. 201 i) (unreported).
0 Bauer v. City of Wheat Ridge, 513 P.2d 203, 204 (Colo. 1973); Quality Sand and Gravel,
Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 738 A.2d 1157, 1 i61 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); Newman, 565
N.E.zd at 353; Driscoll v. Gheewalla, 441 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Me. 1982); Indian Vill. Manor Co.
v. City of Detroit, 147 N.W.2d 731,734 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Fuhst v. Foley, 382 N.E.2d 756,
757 (N.Y. 1978); Lough v. Zoning Bd. of Review of N., 60 A.zd 839, 840 (R.I. 1948); Hartman
v. City of Columbia, 232 S.E.2d 15, 16 (S.C. 1977); Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Bd., 383
P.2d 730, 733 (Wyo. 1963).
91 Mun. Funding, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 853 A.2d 511, 515-I6 (Conn. 2004);
Canal/Norcrest!Columbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 48 P3d 1266, 1268 (Idaho 2002); Bd.
of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.zd 39,41 (Ind. 1961); Brennan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
695 N.E.zd 983, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. i998); Driscoll, 441 A.26 at io26.
92 Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Ky. 1962); Lippoth v. Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals, 311 A.2d 552, 557 (Mc. 1973); Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of Adjustment, 116 P.3d 978,
982-83 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
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implications, this means that the court will not always defer to the zoning
authority's interpretation of an ordinance. 93 Also, the evidence supporting
the zoning authority's decision must be "substantial,"'94 though in many
of these states any amount of evidence in support of the findings will be
deemed substantial.9
Beyond these observable traits there is little uniformity. Indeed,
divergent standards can be found even in the same state. 96 Some states use
the same "lawful-ends" standard that applies to as-applied challenges to
general laws.97 Some place the burden on local governments to justify their
individualized assessments9" or to demonstrate that the zoning provision
authorizing the individualized assessment contains sufficiently definite
standards to ensure uniform exercise of the power to grant or deny.99 In
Minnesota, a failure by a zoning authority to record the reasons for its
decision creates a presumption that the decision is arbitrary.' °°
Some states employ bright lines, such as categorical bars against spot
zoning' °1 or rules permitting re-zoning only to correct a mistake in the
93 Smith Bros. Woodland Mgmt. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 868 A.2d 749, 755-56
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Gullickson v. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Cnty Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890, 892
(N.D. I99i); Bogan v. Sandoval Cnty. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 890 P.2d 395, 401 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1994).
94 Quality Sand and Gravel, Inc., 738 A.2d ati 162.
95 See City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian School, Inc., 642 S.E.2d 824, 825 (Ga.
2007) (holding that an abuse of discretion review means the court will affirm where there is
"any evidence supporting the decision").
96 Compare Cyclone Sand & Gravel Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 351 N.W.2d 778,
783-84 (Iowa 1984), with Rock Island, 112 N.W.2d at 854-55.
97 See Rockford Blacktop Constr. Co. v. Cnty. of Boone, 635 N.E.zd 1077 (I11. App. Ct.
'994).
98 Bauer v. City of Wheat Ridge, 513 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. 1973); Faubel v. Zoning
Comm'n, 224 A.zd 538, 543 (Conn. 1966); City of Naples v. Cent. Plaza of Naples, Inc., 303
So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (overruling the decision of city council because council
was not permitted to base its decision on traffic conditions and other criteria not stated in the
ordinance); Easter v. Mayor of Baltimore, 73 A.2d 491 , 492 (Md. 1950).
99 C & M Sand & Gravel v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 673 Pzd 1013, ioi8 (Colo. App. 1983);
Morton v. Jefferson Parish Council, 419 So. zd 431, 434-35 (La. 1982); MacGibbon v. Bd. of
Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Mass. 1970).
1oo Holasek v. Vill. of Medina, 226 N.W.zd 900, 902-03 (Minn. 1975); Zylka v. City of
Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 1969); Commc'ns Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of Steele, 506 N.W.zd
67o , 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). This requirement is designed "to prevent the municipal body
from offering after-the-fact justifications for its decision which are totally unrelated to the
actual reasons for the initial decision." Uniprop Manufactured Hous., Inc. v. City of Lakeville,
474 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
io Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.zd 1015, 102o n.6 (Alaska 1996); Lum Yip Kee, Ltd.
v. City of Honolulu, 767 P.2d 815, 8 16 (Haw. 1989) ("[Slpot zoning is an arbitrary zoning action
by which a small area within a large area is singled out and specially zoned for a use classifica-
tion different from and inconsistent with the classification of the surrounding area and not in
accord with a comprehensive plan."); Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of Honolulu, 606
P.2d 866,890 (Haw. I980); Gullickson v. Stark County Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 474 N.W.zd 890,
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original code or to correspond to changes in conditions."' 2 Other states
permit spot zoning (or so-called "piecemeal zoning"), 1 3 and many states
even place the burdens of proof and persuasion on the claimant challenging
a spot zoning decision."
Indeed, many state courts treat individualized assessments no
differently than challenges to generalized zoning laws,' even when they
expressly acknowledge that they are performing as-applied review of an
individualized determination. 6 If the government provides any reason for
its decision and the persuasiveness of that reason is fairly debatable, then
the government wins."'
894 (N.D. i991); Pierce v. King Cnty., 382 P.2d 628, 638 (Wash. 1963).
io2 Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 23o A.2d 606, 609 (Conn. 1967); Clayman v.
Prince George's Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Md. 1972); Smith v. Wash. Cnty., 406 P.2d 545,
547-48 (Or. 1965). In addition to any substantive requirements, a split appears to have devel-
oped between those states that adhere to the traditional rule, which treats re-zoning decisions
as legislative actions, and "a substantial minority of jurisdictions [which] now imposes greater
procedural requirements on the re-zoning process." 2 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLAN-
NING DESKBOOK § 7.17 (2d ed. 20 11).
103 See Bossman v. Viii. of Riverton, 684 N.E.2d 427, 431 (I11. App. Ct. 1997); Meyers v.
City of Baton Rouge, 185 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Lanner v. Bd. of Appeal, 202 N.E.2d
777 (Mass. 1964); Currie v. Ryan, 243 So. 2d 48 (Miss. 197o); Treme v. St. Louis Cnty., 609
S.W.2d 706, 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 198o); Bridges, supra note 89, at 17-20.
104 Morningside Ass'n v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 292 A.2d 893, 896 (Conn. 1972);
McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 183 A.zd 572, 578-80 (Del. 1962); Jaffe v. City of Davenport, 179
N.W.2d 554, 555-57 (Iowa 1970); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Com'n, s6I So. 2d 482, 490
(La. 199o); Concept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 817 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005); Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951); McKenzie v. Shelly, 362
P.2d 268, 270 (Nev. i96i); Camara v. City of Warwick, 358 A.2d 23, 30-31 (R.I. 1976); Tillo
v. City of Sioux Falls, 147 N.W.zd 128, 130 (S.D. 1966); City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 275
S.W.2d 477,48o-8I (Tex. 1955).
1o5 See City of Mobile v. Karagan, 476 So. 2d 6o, 63-64 (Ala. 1985); Grayson v. City of
Birmingham, 173 So. 2d 67, 68-70 (Ala. 1963); City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park,
Inc., 916 S.W.2d 95, 99-IOO (Ark. 1996); Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs., v. City of.Hailey, 903
P.2d 741, 748-49 (Idaho 1995); Cyclone Sand and Gravel Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
351 N.W.2d 778,78o-81 (Iowa 1984); McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 49
P3d 522, 534-38 (Kan. 2002); Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Ky. 1962); Bosworth v.
City of Lexington, 125 SW.2d 995, IOOO (Ky. 1939); Hardy v. Mayor of Eunice, 348 So. 2d 143,
148 (La. Ct. App. 1977; Cook v. Metro. Shreveport Bd. of Appeals, 339 So. 2d 1225, 1233 (La.
Ct. App. 1976);) Zengerle v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 276 A.zd 646, 654 (Md. 1971); Mayor of
Clinton v. Hudson, 774 So. 2d 448, 451 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Nevada Contractors v. Washoe
County, 792 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Nev. 199o); Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219, 223-
25 (Nev. 1968); Pulkrabek v. Morton Cnty., 389 N.W.zd 609, 613 (N.D. 1986); Consolidated
Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 452 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ohio 1983); Mid-Continent Life Ins.
Co. v. City of Okla. City, 701 P.zd 412, 413-15 (Okla. 1985); Swain v. Bd. of Adjustment, 433
S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); City of Rutland v. Keiffer, 205 A.2d 400,407 (Vt. 1964);
Buhler v. Racine Cnty., t46 N.W.2d 403,407-08 (Wis. 1966).
1o6 Cyclone Sand and Gravel Co., 351 N.W.zd at 781; Coronet Homes, 439 P.zd. at 223; see
McPherson Landfill, Inc., 49 P3d at 534; Zengerle, 276 A.2d at 654.
107 M &NMobileHome Park, Inc., 916 S.W.2d at 100-02; Sprenger, Grubb &Assocs., 903 P.2d
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Another difficulty arising out of current judicial review standards is
distinguishing individualized assessments from generalized zoning laws.1 °8
There appears to be no clear test. For example, Idaho has employed
three different definitions within just the last few years. Idaho's Local
Land Use Planning Act provides a meaningful right of judicial review to a
landowner who is denied an application or aggrieved by an individualized
land use decision. 109 The grant or denial of an application must specify
the "ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application," the
"reasons" for the decision, and "[tihe actions, if any, that the applicant
could take to obtain a permit."1  The decision is then subjected to the
same judicial review as the decision of a government agency under Idaho's
Administrative Procedure Act."'
Until recently the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted this provision to
cover any quasi-judicial land use decision,"' distinguishing only between
"enacting general zoning legislation" and "applying existing legislation and
policy to specific, individual interests as in a proceeding on an application
for rezone of particular property."" 3 But in 2008, the court narrowed the
availability of judicial review; only applications for permits that could
authorize development triggered the right.1 4 The Idaho legislature
responded in 2010 by expressly extending the right of judicial review
to applications for zoning changes, spot zoning, variances, special use
permits, and "other similar applications.""' It still remains unclear which
applications count as "similar."" 6
at 748-49; Jaffe, 179 N.W.2d at 555-57; R.A. Putnam & Assocs., v. City of Mendota Heights,
51 oN.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see Cyclone Sand and Gravel Co., 351 N.W.2d at
783-84; Hardy, 348 So. 2d at 148; Coronet Homes, 439 P.zd at 224-25.
i o8 Archdiocese of Portland v. Washington Cnty., 458 P.2d 682,684-86 (Or. 1969) (stating
that though spot zoning is subjected to heightened scrutiny, conditional use permit decisions
are not). See the valiant effort made in Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albu-
querque, 184 P.3d 411, 421-25 (N.M. 2oo8), and the helpful attempt in Zimmerman v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 218 P.3d 400, 413-17 (Kan. 2009).
109 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6519(4) (2003).
iio Id.
i I ld.; see also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 176 P3d i26, 131
(Idaho 2007).
112 Jill S. Holinka, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions in the zi" Century, 53 ADVO-
CATE 18 (2010).
113 Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947,949 (Idaho 198o).
114 Holinka, supra note 112, at 18-19; see also Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
210 P.3d 532, 538 (Idaho 2oo9); Giltrer Dairy, LLC v. Jerome Cnty., I8i P.3d 1238, 1240-41
(Idaho 2008).




3. Lessons from City of Cleburne.-States courts are not the only judicial
bodies to have rediscovered limitations on the regulatory authority of local
governments in recent decades. The Supreme Court employed second-
order rational basis review in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living'Center.11
That case involved an equal protection challenge to the denial of a special
use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded."8
Other multiple-dwelling facilities, including boarding and lodging houses,
fraternities and sororities, hospitals, and nursing homes, were allowed in
the zone as of right. 119
Rejecting the argument that mental retardation is a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, the Supreme Court ernployed rational basis review.2 0
Under this review, the Court held that the ordinance was irrational as applied
to the Center; the mentally retarded posed no special threats 'to the city's
legitimate interests.' The City's inferences that local residents harbored
fear toward the mentally retarded and that'nearby school pupils might harass
residents of the Center were not grounded in record facts "cognizable in
a zoning proceeding.' 2i  As justification for its denial, the city cited the
fact that the proposed' site was located Within a five-hundred year flood
plain; that the city might bear legal responsibility for actions of the Center's
residents; that a large number of residents would occupy the Center; and
that the Center would increase traffic congestion. The Court discounted
these proposed justifications reasoning that none of them distinguished the
Center from the nursing homes, hospitals, boarding houses, fraternity and
sorority houses, and the other uses that were permitted within the zone.2 3
The Court concluded that the special use permit requirement rested upon
"irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."'2 14
Despite its insistence that it was employing traditional rational basis
review, the Cleburne Court deferred little to the city. Had the Court afforded
the ordinance a presumption of constitutional validity, the city's proffered
justifications for the ordinance would have sufficed.' 5 Thus it is clear that
the city actually bore the burden of persuasion. The Court assumed that
the city's stated interests were legitimate, but the means that the city used
to achieve its ends did not stand similarly shielded .from scrutiny. Also, the
117 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
118 Id. at 436-37.
ii9 Id. at 447.
120 Id. at 439-47.
121 Id. at 448.
Sz2 Id at 448-49.
.123 Id. at 449-5o.
124 Id. at 450.
125 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Court extended to the Cleburne Living Center, rather than the city, the
benefit of the factual presumption.' 6
These features of the majority's reasoning did not escape Justice
Marshall, who wrote separately to object to the Court's "narrow, as-applied
remedy."'2 7 Though the Court insisted that it was not using heightened
scrutiny, the city's ordinance would "surely" have survived traditional
rational basis review.' Marshall faulted the majority for failing to articulate
the justification for applying what he labeled "second-order" rational basis
review,2 9 a form of heightened scrutiny that he asserted "actually [led]"
to the holding.130 He opined that the Court's lack of transparency left no
principled ground to distinguish cases in which more searching inquiry was
warranted.'
Marshall was surely correct that the Cleburne majority employed some
heightened level of review. But when Cleburne Living Center's claim
is viewed as an as-applied challenge to an individualized assessment a
principled ground for the Court's rigorous review emerges. One might infer
that the Court declined to extend to the city's ordinance the deference due
to legislative enactments because, as applied to the Cleburne Living Center,
the ordinance acted less like legislation and more like adjudication. 3 ' In
cases of individualized assessments, such as Cleburne, it makes sense to
review the municipality's decision as if it were a decision of a lower court or
an adjudication of a regulatory agency.'33
Viewed this way, it is irrelevant that Cleburne involved an equal
protection challenge rather than a due process challenge." While it
is true that the Cleburne Court was primarily concerned with irrational
IZ6 The Court faulted the city for making factual claims for which the Court found no
support in the record. Id. at 448-5o (majority opinion).
127 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 458. Marshall observed that traditional rational basis review permitted local
governments to take incremental steps to address perceived dangers, even to the point of
singling out one land use from analogous uses. Id. Also, a court employing rational basis review
would not "sift through the record" in search of a factual foundation for the local government's
action. Id. Finally, the majority departed from traditional rational review by placing the bur-
den on the city to prove that its distinctions were sensible. Id. at 459.
130 Id. at 456.
131 Id. at 46o.
132 Compare Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Liddle, I 12 N.W.zd 85z, 855 (Iowa
1962), and Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.zd 130, 135 (Kan. 1978), with Albuquerque
Commons P'ship v. City Council of Albuquerque, 184 P.3 d 411, 421-22 (N.M. 2oo8), andFa-
sano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. 507 P.zd 23, 29 (Or. 1973).
133 3 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL.,JIIE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 40, at 40-12 to -63
(4th ed. 201 I) (comparing re-zonings as legislative acts with re-zonings as quasi-judicial acts);
Lessons from RLUIPA, supra note 58, at 733-37.
134 But see Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.2d 760 (Del. 1988) (holding that equal protection
was not violated when no group homes were allowed, regardless of disability).
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discrimination against a class of citizens,3 ' it was the irrationality of the
discrimination, not any special or suspect status of the class, which gave
the claim its weight.'36 The permit denial would have been arbitrary and
irrational no matter which constitutional provision Cleburne Living Center
asserted. Heightened scrutiny was justified not because Cleburne Living
Center chose to assert an equal protection claim, but rather because the
city exercised its discretion arbitrarily, unmoored from rational objectives.
4. Failure to Articulate Reasonable Ends.-This cursory review of the
case law concerning individualized assessments should be sufficient to
demonstrate that work remains to be done in this area. But the way forward
opens to view. As with "fairly-debatable" review under Euclidand "lawful-
ends" review under Nectow, an examination of the way in which courts use
second-order rational basis review demonstrates that courts are uneasy
about the objectives or ends that local governments articulate in justifying
their decisions.
37
For example, the Indiana high court overturned a town's rejection of a
petition for construction of a church. 3 The court rejected the justification
the town offered for its decision-that the church would bring children
into a neighborhood of predominantly child-less residents.'39 The court
declared that exclusion of children was an invalid purpose. Private interests
"should not outweigh" general public welfare.' The court then provided
a lesson in the proper ends and objectives toward which the police powers
may be directed:
Zoning ordinances must find and support their validity in the
police power of the state, which can only be exercised in the
general public interest of safety, health and morals. Rights to the
use of private property may not be restricted except upon such
basis. It was never intended that zoning laws should be used
for the purpose of creating special privileges or private rights in
property which result from creating an exclusive community.'
135 Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 E3d 198, 202 (6th Cir. 1995).
136 CleburneLivingCtr, 473 U.S. at 439-47.
137 Hall v. Jefferson Cnty., 450 So. 2d 792, 795-96 (Ala. i984) (overturning unreasonable
refusal to rezone claimant's tract; that claimant could make productive use of property without
re-zoning was not a reason satisfying the County's required threshold showing that the refusal
had a "substantial relation to a legitimate public purpose"); City of Naples v. Cent. Plaza of
Naples, Inc., 303 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that city council acted
unreasonably by basing its decision on criteria not stated in the zoning ordinance).
138 Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1961).
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Other courts have expressed similar skepticism about the authenticity
or legitimacy of local governments' asserted objectives where the
local governments have exercised discretion to make individualized
assessments. 4 ' In reviews of spot zoning decisions, for example, Illinois
requires that the government show that the decision was made "for the
public good" and not "in deference to the wishes of certain individuals."
1 43
In one early case arising out of Illinois, a zoning ordinance amendment
changed half of one block in Chicago, including the claimant's land, from
apartment designation to single-family residential.' 44 The court purported
to employ "fairly-debatable" review and to place the ordinance behind the
"bulwark of presumptive validity." 145 Nevertheless, the court scoured the
record for an explanation for the burden placed on the individual claimant's
land.'46 The court found on the record "no actual or reasonable connection"
between the re-zoning decision and the "public health, safety, comfort,
morals, or welfare." 1
47
Much like the Nectow Court, the Illinois court appears to have used
exacting review in large part because it was skeptical about the city's
purposes. The re-zoning decision, the court concluded, was "not made
for the public good, but was made only for the benefit of those residents
of the block who desired to exclude" the church. 148 The court gave no
credence to the city's asserted interest in preserving the block as "an oasis
of gracious family living." 49 Rather, the court launched into a discourse on
142 W. Paving Const. Co. v. Boulder Cnty., 506 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Colo. 1973) (stating that
the county's proffered justification "tax[es] credulity"); Concerned Citizens for McHenry, Inc.
v. City of McHeny, 395 N.E.2d 944,950 (11. App. Ct. 1979); Golden v. City of Overland Park,
584 P.2d 130, 135-37 (Kan. 1978); MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347, 351 (Mass.
1970); Holasek v. Vill. of Medina, 226 N.W.zd 900, 903 (Minn. 1975); Commc'ns Props., Inc.
v. Cnty. of Steele, 506 N.W.zd 670, 672-73 (Minn. Ct. App. '993); Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 507 Pad 23, 30 (Or. 1973) (en banc); Bd. of Cnty. Sup'rs v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390,
395-96 (Va. 1959) (re-zoning served "private rather than public interests"); see Four States
Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672-74 (La. 1975) ("A review of this
record shows clearly that the original motivation for seeking the re-zoning of the subject
property was the selfish interest of the intervenor and perhaps a few other nearby property
owners."); Page v. City of Portland, 165 P.ad 28o, 282-86 (Or. 1946) (holding an amendatory
zoning ordinance to be an invalid exercise of police power where no legally sufficient reason
was shown by the City Council in re-zoning two lots in a predominantly residential neighbor-
hood for commercial use).
143 Bossman v. Viii. of Riverton, 684 N.E.2d 427, 431 (II1. App. Ct. 1997) (quoting Trust
Co. of Chi. v. City of Chi., 96 N.E.2d 499,504 (111. 1951)).
144 Trust Co. of Chi., 96 N.E.ad at 502.
145 Id. at 504.
146 Id. at 504-05.
147 Id. at 505.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 502.
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the meaning and reach of the police powers, which authorize burdens upon
property rights only "when public welfare demands."'' 0
New Hampshire once addressed this concern by statute. An older
version of New Hampshire's zoning enabling act accorded no deference
to a zoning board determination and authorized a trial judge to overturn
the determination "when he is persuaded by a balance of probabilities,
on the evidence before the court, that the order or decision is unjust or
unreasonable."'5 I It is not immediately clear why New Hampshire amended
this statute.'
E. Burdens on Constitutional Rights-Limited Heightened Scrutiny
In some instances, when a regulatory burden on property rights also
burdens a fundamental constitutional right or denies to some landowner
the equal protection of the laws, the regulation is subjected to heightened
scrutiny. Of course, in such cases the regulation is scrutinized not as
a burden on land use but rather as a burden on the other protected
constitutional right at stake. Nevertheless, if the exercise of the protected
constitutional right involves the use of land, the heightened scrutiny will
benefit the claimant as a land user.
A prominent and controversial example of this heightened scrutiny is
the prophylactic protection required by the substantial burden provision
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA"). s3 This provision requires strict scrutiny review of land use
regulations that substantially burden religious exercise."M Thus, where
150 Id. at 502-03.
r5i Barry v. Town of Amherst, 430 A.2d 132, 134 (N.H. 1981) (quoting Cook v. Town of
Sanbornton, 392 A.zd 1201, 1202 (N.H. 1978)).
152 It appears that zoning board decisions are now presumed lawful and factually reason-
able. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 677:6 (2007); Olszak v. Town of New Hampton, 661 A.2d 768,
770 (N.H. 1995).
153 42 U.S.C. § 2ooocc(a) (zoo6). Less controversially, RLUIPA also forbids discrimina-
tion against religious land users, requires equal treatment as between religious and secular
land users, and forbids exclusion of religious land uses. 42 U.S.C. § zooocc(b) (2oo6).
154 One might reasonably expect RLUIPA's substantial burden provision to provide sig-
nificant protection for religious exercises performed on land. But courts have gone to extreme
lengths to avoid giving the substantial burden provision its normal reading and intended
reach. Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The Curious Forms of the Substantial Burden
Test in RLUIPA, 40 REAL EsT. L.J. 15, 137-47 (2011) [hereinafter, Resurrecting the Bogeyman].
This is understandable in light of the conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court on
the validity of religious exemptions. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-37( 1997)
(holding RFRA exceeded Congress' remedial authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
and was unconstitutional). For a sense of the controversy surrounding RLUIPA's substantial
burden provision and other Congressional attempts to restore religious liberty exemptions,
see Angela Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership, and the Common Good,
2 ALBANY GOV'T L. REv. 485, 500, 511, 525-36 (2009) (advocating that even though varying
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applicable, RLUIPA requires that courts afford no deference to land use
regulators; rather, land use regulators are required to articulate compelling
interests, persuade the court that the articulated interests are their actual
objectives, and demonstrate that the regulations are the least restrictive
means of achieving their objectives.' When it works properly, RLUIPA is
quite effective at rooting out latent discrimination." 6
interpretations of the substantial burden test in the RLUIPA exist, the overall purpose of
the RLUIPA is served); Marci A. Hamilton, The Unintended Consequences RLUIPA Has Visited
on Residential Neighborhoods, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIoUs LAND USES, ZONING, AND THE
CouRTs 6I, 68-69 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., American Bar Association 2009);
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding
theExtremes But Missing the Libery, I 18 HARv. L. REV. 155, 200-13 (2004) (discussing the history
of religious land use regulation laws and test before the RLUIPA and how the substantial bur-
den test from the RLUIPA incorporates some of the previous rules, but ultimately advocat-
ing that religious liberty is maximized most when governmental interference is minimized);
Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 755, 764-70
(999); Shelley Ross Saxer, Faith in Action: Religious Accessory Uses and Land Use Regulation,
zoo8 UTAH L. REV. 593, 621-27 (2008) (discussing the substantial burden test in RLUIPA and,
in consequence of Congress not defining what a substantial burden is, the result is a wide
variety of interpretations ranging from a broad interpretation of burdens to a narrow read-
ing at both the federal and state level). Compare Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation?
Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 862-64, 88o-89, 892--97,
922-24 (2OOO) (providing an extensive review of religious land use and issues surrounding the
different acts enacted by Congress, and test developed by the courts over time, ultimately ad-
vocating in favor of protection the free speech and equal protection in lieu of RLUIPA), with
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 323-24, 332-41,348-53 (2003) (arguing that
RLUIPA bears a skeptical legislative history because the states were not properly consulted
and presenting a more pointed plan of action that land use regulation is matter best left to the
states rather than Congress because each state has a different "master plan" regarding zoning
and separate reasoning for its zoning ordinances and restrictions). But the effects have been
unfortunate. See Resurrecting the Bogeyman, supra, at 137-47. In particular, the courts' contor-
tions of RLUIPA's plain language have rendered the statute largely ineffectual for identifying
latent discrimination. As currently interpreted, RLUIPA generally leaves local governments
free to act for unlawful ends, as long as they do not express their discriminatory motives.
155 42 U.S.C. § 2ooocc(a)(i) (2oo6).
156 See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Boulder Cnty., 612 E Supp. 2d 1163,
1170-71, 1174-76, 1 184-9o (D. Colo. 2009) (holding the Church had been treated on unequal
terms as a non-religious institution and that the Board of Commissioners had violated RLU-
IPA); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, z8 F. Supp. zd 1203,
1221-24, 1226-32 (C.D. Cal. 2ooz) (holding Cottonwood had met the substantial burden re-
quirement in 42 U.S.C. § 2ooocc(a)(i) and that when the City was unable to show a further-
ance of a government interest, or that it was the most restrictive means, allowing the City to
proceed under their proffered reasoning would permit, discrimination and Cottonwood was
entitled to a preliminary injunction).
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F Other Standards of Judicial Review
Some other types of land use disputes should be examined cursorily
for present purposes. First, the Supreme Court cut a narrow path into the
thicket of Euclidean deference in two cases, Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission"5 7 and Dolan v. City of Tigard5 In these cases, the Supreme
Court applied the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine5 9 to land use
regulation. In this context the doctrine holds that the government cannot
require a landowner to relinquish his rights under the Takings Clause in
exchange for a discretionary benefit "where the benefit sought has little
or no relationship to the property."" From the combination of the Nollan
and Dolan decisions emerged the so-called "essential nexus"'' and "rough
proportionality" 161 tests. Taken together, these tests produce the rule that,
if the government exacts a property interest in consideration of restoring
some property interest taken by a previous regulation, then the exaction
must substantially advance and be roughly proportional to a legitimate
state interest. The Nollan and Dolan decisions provide a mechanism "for
making [an] as applied challenges[I to a land use requirement which does
not substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest."163 Because
the basis for a Nollan-Dolan claim is the Takings Clause, not the Due
Process Clause, the landowner's remedy.is not invalidity of the decision
but rather just compensation."
While the doctrinal force of Nectow and Cleburne has largely been
left unexplored, Nollan and Dolan have received lavish attention, both
critical 6 and favorable.'66 For present purposes, two brief observations
will suffice. First, despite the presumption of invalidity, any asserted state
157 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
158 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
159 Id. at 385; see also David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny,
75 N.C. L. REv. 1243, 1245 (1997) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
ioz HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)).
16o Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
161 Id. at 386.
16z Id. at 391.
163 2 KMIEC, supra note 102, at § 7:19.
164 See id.
165 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 159 at 1245-46; Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27-41 (2000); Mark Fenster, Takings For-
malism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 6O9,
667-68 (2004); see also Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera
of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 989, 998 (1995) (discussing the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions to argue that through conditions "a state is permitted to do indirectly
what it may not do directly").
166 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859,88i-83 (1995); Dana, supra note t59 (quoting Sullivan).
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interest will suffice to justify the regulation. Here, as in the other instances
of judicial review examined above, the regulator has discretion to decide
what ends it will pursue. The reviewing court defers to that decision, even
as it fulfills the role for which it is better suited, namely scrutinizing the
relationship between means and end. Second, Nollan and Dolan illustrate
the Court's renewed interest in articulating the rational boundaries of local
government power. It is worth observing the implicit acknowledgment
that local governments' power to place conditions upon land use cannot be
exercised arbitrarily without implicating the Takings Clause.
Another type of claim that illustrates the idiosyncratic judicial review of
land use decisions is the non-exaction regulatory takings claim. At least in
theory, regulatory takings cases are not about the validity or invalidity of the
state action. Just as a local government must pay just compensation under.
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it takes title by eminent
domain, if the local government in the exercise of its police powers regulates
possession, use, or exploitation of property but, in Justice Holmes's words,
goes "too far,"' 6 7 then it can be required to pay just compensation. Either
way, the state action is deemed valid and the only remedy available to the
claimant is compensation for the property rights lawfully taken by the
government.
168
The Court has accordingly devised a regulatory takings test that does
not measure the relationship between means and end. The logic of that test
is nearly inscrutable. 169 Meanwhile, some states have gone their own way.
167 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393,415 (1922).
168 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1982).-
169 In the absence of an appropriation of title or a permanent physical occupation, the
now-familiar formula for ascertaining when a regulatory taking has occurred requires the re-
viewing court to: (I) balance the public interest vindicated by the regulation against the frac-
tion of economically-valuable uses lost by the owner, which have market value and are not
prohibited by background principles of property law; (2) ascertain whether the state action
looks more like an exercise of the eminent domain power or the police powers; and (3) mea-
sure the extent of interference with the owner's investment-backed expectations. Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982); see also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-32 (1978). The fraction in the first factor contains
yet another level of complication, the so-called denominator problem. The denominator in
the loss fraction is the total amount of use of the property taken as a whole; conceptual sever-
ance is not allowed. Id. at 130-3 1. But if the interests in the asset have actually been severed
each might be considered separately. See Pa. Coal Co., 26o U.S. at 414-15. If the claim is for a
per se taking then the denominator is all uses measured over all time. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337-38 (2002). But if the Penn
Central formula or 'some other takings test comes out in favor of just compensation, then the
claim can succeed even if the deprivation is temporary. First Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
L.A. Cnty., 482 U.S. 304,318 (1987).
Just when one is reasonably certain that one has sorted all of this out, one must attempt
to explain it to first-year law students.
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These states employ sonieform of presumption-means-ends test when
reviewing regulatory claims."' 0 These tests often mimic the Euclid test.1 1
A third type of claim that illustrates how judicial review works in the
land use context arises out of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCX')
which employs a unique mechanism for compelling local communities
to accommodate cell phone towers.172 Any state or local government that
forbids the placement of a wireless service facility must state its reasons
in writing and must support its reasoning with "substantial evidence."'7 3 It
must not "unreasonably discriminate" among providers and its regulations
must not have the effect of prohibiting wireless service.'74
Judicial review under the TCA differs from traditional review of land
use regulations in three respects. 75 First, the provisions of the TCA change
the presumption of factual validity so that the local government bears
the burden of proof;7 6 if the local government must show its reasoning
and provide substantial evidence, there is a greater likelihood that the
reviewing court will discover shortcomings in the record.'77 Second, the
TCA takes certain asserted'state interests off the table; for example, a state
or local government may not intend to favor one provider over another)7
Third, an appropriate claim of discrimination or impeding service under
the TCA might invite de novo judicial review. 79
In other important respects, judicial review under the TCA is just as
deferential as review of a decision by an administrative agency; the court is
authorized neither to make its own fact-fin'dings nor to substitute its own
170 See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co:, v. Harris Cnty., 89 E3d 1481, 1488 (I ith Cir.
1996) (finding regulatory taking under Georgia constitution if "zoning decision 'presents a sig-
nificant detriment to the landowner and is insubstantially related to the public health, safety,
morality and welfare").
17 5 See, e.g., Archambault v. Wadlow, 594 A.2d o 15, 1 o 9-zo (Conn. App. Ct. 199 1).
172 See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2oo6); see also John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as Visual
Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PO'v 537, 556-57 (2009) (describing § 332 as a
"compromise provision" that recognized local government concerns regarding cell phone tow-
ers); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HAov. J. ON LEGIS.
289, 319-21 (201 ) (characterizing § 332 as a "cooperative" statute that allowed local govern-
ments to include their own concerns in zoning regulations).
173 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2006).
174 47 U.S.C. § 3 32(c)(7 )(B)(i) (2oo6).
175 See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F3d 490,493 (2d Cir. j999).
176 See T-Mobile Ne. LLC. v. City of Lawrence, 755 E Supp. 2d 286, 291 (D. Mass.
2010); PrimieCo Pets. Commc'ns., L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, io64 (N.D.
I11. 1998).
177 See, e.g., Town of Oyster Bay, 166 E3d at 495; PrimeCo, 26 F. Supp. 2d at Io64.
178 See AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F3d 423, 427 (4th
Cir. 1998).
179 Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc'ns Entrers., Inc., 173 F3d 9, 16 n.7 (ist Cir.
1999).
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judgments for reasonable determinations of the local government. 18° The
'VCA leaves the police powers intact and deems the traditional justifications
for land use regulation, including aesthetics,18' to be reasonable. 82 The
TCA thus suggests a model for judicial review, adumbrating the proposal
in Part IV below. It strikes a considered balance between requiring local
government transparency and preserving deference to local regulatory
objectives.
Finally, procedural due process doctrine places restrictions on land
use regulatory authority, but "[blecause courts generally characterize land
use allocations as 'legislative' rather than 'quasi-judicial,' the procedural
protections ... are limited."'' 83
II. A PERFECTIONIST THEORY OF THE POLICE POWERS
A. The Objectives of the Police Powers
1. The Problem of Abdication to Local Governments.-The deferential
standard of review set out by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid and
Nectow presupposes that local governments will generally exercise their
land use regulatory powers for some common or public good, and not
arbitrarily. State courts generally imitate this deference as to the legitimacy
and importance of the local government's asserted objectives, even, when
those assertions are so broad and ambiguous as to provide no reasonable
limitation on the exercise of police power. 84
Significantly, many state legislatures have adopted the canonical
formulation of the police powers articulated in Mugler and Village of Euclid.
Nearly all state zoning enabling acts authorize land use regulations to
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.'18 Most states
t8o Town of Oyster Bay, t66 F.3d at 494; see also Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244
E3d 51, 58-59 (ist Cir. 2001) (interpreting "substantial evidence" review under the TCA as
requiring reliance on local government's findings of fact, from which reasonable inferences
should be based).
I81 See Nagle, supra note 172, at 557-58.
182 SeeAT&T Wireless, 155 E3d at 427-28.
183 2 KMIEC, supra note 102, at § 7:17.
184 For example, many state courts have ruled that local governments that claim to act
for the maintenance of property values are serving the "general welfare," without further
inquiry. See Plaza Recreational Ctr. v. Sioux City, 111 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Iowa 1961); E & G En-
ters. v. City of.Mount Vernon, 373 N.W.2d 693,694-95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (citing Anderson
v. City of Cedar Rapids 168 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1969); Plaza Recreational Ctr., iii N.W.zd at
762)). Promoting "peace and good order" is deemed a valid end, Freeman v. Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 34 P.2d 534,539 (Mont. 1934), as is concentration of stores into shopping centers, which
constitute a "convenience, if not a necessity." Anderson, 168 N.W.2d at 743-44.
185 ALA. CODE § 11-52-72 (2oo
8
); ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01 (201 I); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 14-56-403 (1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-I11, 115 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 301 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161 (West
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add morals to the list.'86 Some states add additional broad values, such as
convenience and comfort;187 prosperity; 8 peace or order;8 9 appearance
2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§36--66-2,5(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6502 (2012); 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-1 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-601 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 414.1 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-741 (West 2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
100.201(2) (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4721 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30-A,
§ 4312(3) (2011); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch; 8o8, § 2A (LexisNexis 1975); MscIi. CoMP. LAws §
125.3201 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-3(0) (West
20 11); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 65.662 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-30I (zoi I); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 14-401 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.020 (20.11); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:16 (Lexis-
Nexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-2 1-1 (West 2011);
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16oA-381 (2011); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-47-O1 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.O2 (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT.
tit. II, § 43-101 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 227.090 (2011); 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5226 (West 200i);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-30 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-710(A) (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 11-2-13 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7-201 (201 ); UTAH CODE ANN. § io-a-102( I) (Lex-
isNexis 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2283 (2008); WASH.
REV. CODE § 35.63.080 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-3-I (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 59.69 (West 2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 15-i-6oi (zoil).
I86 For example, Delaware's statute reads:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated towns may regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 3, § 301 (2011); see also, ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-403 (1998); COLO REV.
STAT. § 30-28-115 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. §36-66-5 (2006); 65 ILL. CoM. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-I
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-6OI (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE § 414.1 (West 2012); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.201(2) (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4721 (2009); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-I-3() (West 2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 76-2-301 (zoi I); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-401 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.020 (zo I); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 4o:55D-2 (West 2oo8); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-I (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 16oA-38I (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-47-0I (1983); OKLA. STAr. ANN. tit. I1, § 43-101
(2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 227.090 (201 I); 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5226 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-29-71o(A) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7-201 (201 ); UTAH CODE ANN. § IO-9a-io2(I)
(LexisNexis 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.080 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-3-1 (Lexis-
Nexis 2007).
187 IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-601 (LexisNexis 2009); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 A, § 2(a)
(2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 (LexisNexis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 227.090 (2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § Io-9a-I02(I) (LexisNexis 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-3-I (LexisNexis 2007).
188 ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-403 (1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-I 15 (2011); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 65.662 (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 (LexisNexis 2009); I6 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 5226 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-71o(A) (2004);TENN, CODE ANN. § 13-7-201
(201I); UTAH CODE ANN. § i0-9a-102(I) (LexisNexis 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302
(2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-3-1 (LexisNexis 2007).
189 ARK CODa ANN. § 14-56-403 (i998q); CoLo. RE-v. STAT. § 30-28-115 (2011), 6 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 5226 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-71o(A) (2OO4);TENN. CODE ANN. §
13-7-201 (2OI I); UTAH CODE ANN. § IO-9a-102(I) (LexisNexis 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
8A-3-1 (LexisNexis 2007).
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or aesthetics; 19° fundamental fairness;191 privacy; 192 and the protection of
life,193 families, 9' property,19 and constitutional rights. 96
Some states are more specific in identifying their objectives and interests.
Connecticut, for example, permits regulation "to provide adequate light
and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration
of population and to facilitate the adequate provision for transportation,
water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements."197 Vermont
seeks through its zoning act "to encourage development of a rich cultural
environment and to foster the arts."'98 Michigan authorizes land use
regulation in order "to meet the needs of the state's citizens for food, fiber,
energy, and other natural resources." 19
As these examples illustrate, a handful of states have identified distinct
values and enumerated specific state interests that follow from those values.
Unfortunately, neither local governments nor courts pay much attention to
these state-specific distinctions. Like vegetables cooked in a crock pot,
objectives enumerated by state legislatures emerge from the land use
planning process a drab, indistinct mush-devoid of any distinct flavor.
This is a particular deficiency in judicial review of land use regulations;
courts treat the statements of objectives in enabling acts as pro forma
exercises, signifying nothing. Thus, even where state legislatures have
made an effort to require the pursuit of plural and distinct values, courts
defeat any attempt to hold local governments to the mandates.
190 S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2 9- 7 1o(A) (2004).
191 UTAH CODE ANN. § io-9a-102(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
192 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007).
193 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 4 6-i. 5(I3),4(a) (West 2012).
194 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.69 (West 2011).
195 HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 46-1.5(13), 4(a) (West 2012);VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007).
196 VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007).
197 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2 (West 2ot2). New York's statute is similar:
Subject to the constitultion and general laws of this state, every city is empowered:
... To regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the location
of buildings, designed for specified uses, and for said purposes to divide the city
into districts and to prescribe for each such district the trades and industries that
shall be excluded or subjected to special regulation and the uses for which build-
ings may not be erected or altered. Such regulations shall be designed to promote
the public health, safety and general welfare and shall be made with reasonable
consideration, among other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suit-
ability for particular uses, the conservation of property values and the direction of
building development, in accord with a well considered plan.
N.Y. GEN. CiTy LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2012); see also ALA. CODE § 11-52-72 (2008); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 163.3161 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6502 (2012); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/I 1-13-I (West 1993); Ky. REV. STAr. ANN. § 100.201(2) (LexisNexis 2004); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 8o8, § 2A (LexisNexis I975); N.1-. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:16 (LexisNexis 2007); I6 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 5226 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § io-9a-Io2(l) (LexisNexis 2007); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 59.69 (West 2oI1).
198 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302 (2007).
199 MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.3201 (2006).
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Most state legislatures make no such attempt to articulate clear standards.
Two states completely abdicate to local governments the authority to define
the police powers by authorizing them to draft their own comprehensive
plans to identify their own legitimate ends. z°° Under such a scheme, the
adopted comprehensive plan itself is supposed to "'guard against prejudice,
arbitrary decision making, and improper motives' by providing substantive
standards against which to measure individual zoning decisions." 0'
States are thus, on the whole, no more specific in their enumeration of
valid ends than are federal courts. Local governments are trusted to direct
their regulatory powers toward rational ends and they often do. Still, it is all
too common for local governments to exercise their land use authority in
arbitrary ways. 02 Decision-makers frequently fail to ground their decisions
in rational objectives and sometimes act for private gain. Corruption
is a prevalent problem in land use regulation."' As individualized
assessments," discretionary zoning,05  and bilateral development
agreements 06 have become more common, opportunities for favoritism and
for arbitrary, unconstitutional action have increased. 07 Citizens are largely
200 ALASKA STAT. §29.40.030 (2010); see also CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 65800, 65850 (West
2OO9). The Alaska state legislature does not identify any legitimate police powers but instead
leaves to each municipality the job of stating its own "policies, goals, and standards." ALASKA
STAT. §z9.40.o3o(a)(I) (20l0).
201 Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Bd. of Adjustment and
Appeals, 904 P.2d 373, 377-78 (Alaska 1995) (quoting S. Anchorage Concerned Coal., Inc. v.
Coffey, 862 P.2d 168, 174 (Alaska 1993)).
202 One scholar, comparing ad hoc land use planning in Australia to a "fatalistic lottery,"
captured the spirit of the enterprise by quoting from Gilbert and Sullivan's musical play, The
Mikado:
See how the Fates their gifts allot,
ForA is happy, B is not.
Yet B is worthy, I dare say
Of more prosperity than A.
Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in WNDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS 20-22 (Donald G.
Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978).
203 JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF PLACE 230-31 (1987); SUsAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECON-
OMY 25 n.20 (1978).
204 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
90 (3d ed. 2005); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §4.15 (5th ed. 2003).
205 Laycock, supra note 154, at 767; Lessons from RLUIPA, supra note 58, at 733-37.
206 Carruth v. Madera, 233 Cal. App. zd 688, 695-96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); DAVID
L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON'T WORK 53 (1994); Richard Cowart,
Experience, Motivations and Issues, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROS-
PECTS 9, 10-25 (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L..Marsh eds., 1989); ELLICKSON & BEEN, Supra
note 204, at 303-04.
207 See Carol Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence-
An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588-89 (1990). See generally Alejandro Cama-
cho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Modelfor Fostering Equality, Community Involve-
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shut out of bilateral negotiations; as a result, development agreements are
often created with minimal public input, without public accountability, and
without regard for constitutional constraints 08 The use of development
agreements "facilitates unfair dealing by providing real estate developers
special access to local officials at a critical stage of the land use and
development process."2°9 Individualized assessments often result in ad
hoc decisions that are divorced from long-term planning goals t" and are
sometimes used to discriminate in unlawful ways.
2 1 l
Municipal lawyers can help officials avoid common legal errors, but
their advice is only as strong as what the law requires; they represent
the government's interest, not the interests of citizens. When citizens
suffer adverse consequences as a result of local government corruption,
landowners, neighbors, and other members of the community are often
without recourse. Because courts largely treat privately negotiated
development deals with the same deference extended to generalized
zoning laws, such deals are often ratified without scrutiny.212 Disputes over
alleged improprieties are "decided overwhelmingly in favor of municipal
officers. ' 213 This does not indicate that alleged misconduct is ethically
reasonable or free of impropriety, only that the law does not currently
prohibit the conduct alleged.2 4 Where, as is common, land use decisions
affect less than a majority of a municipality's population, aggrieved citizens
are unlikely to muster the political will to change the law. And landowners
ment andAdaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3,6 (2005)
[hereinafter Mustering the Missing Voices] (deeming negotiated land use regulation "of dubious
legitimacy); Alejandro Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Modelfor Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement andAdaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions Installment Two, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005) [hereinafter Mustering the Missing Voices] (proposing a collabora-
tive model to overcome the favoritism that results from bilateral land use regulation); Joseph
Coomes, Jr., Practical Concerns in Drafting and Negotiating Development Agreements, in DEvELoP-
MENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROSPECTS supra note 2o6, at 133 (discussing the
dangers arising out of negotiated land use agreements); Douglas W. Kmiec, Protecting Vitaland
Pressing Governmental Interests-A Proposalfora New Zoning Enabling Act, 30 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 19, 20 (1986) (noting the tendency of land use regulators "to regulate in a man-
ner that either imposes subjective and costly aesthetic preferences, or arbitrarily adopts the
misguided opinions of a central planner over the informed wisdom" of the entire community).
208 David Callies & Julie Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and
the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 5'
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 664 (2001 ); Mustering the Missing Voices, supra note 207, at 35-65.
209 Mustering the Missing Voices, supra note 207, at 42.
210 Id. at 53-56.
2 11 Laycock, supra note 154, at 767.
212 Mustering the Missing Voices, sopra note 207, at 65--66; ELULCKSoN & B-EN, supra note
204, at 302-03, 349.
213 Patricia E. Salkin, Ethical Considerations in Land Use Decision Making: 2006 Annual




are not entirely free to vote against corrupt officials with their feet; even if
they move, they cannot take with them their land, schools, churches, social
groups, and other rooted aspects of their lives."1 5
One of the reasons for this arbitrariness might be that local governments
are not presently required to keep any rational end clearly in sight as they
regulate. The generalities of many enabling acts and the loose review
standards established by Euclid and its progeny allow regulatory officials
to state ambiguous justifications for their actions after the fact. Land use
regulators are thus excused from identifying and articulating particular
ends before adopting regulatory means. Without having a clear objective in
mind, land use regulators are also unlikely to adopt rational means.
2. The Rationality of State Interests.-Because state interests are understood
to be non-arbitrary, they must have some foundation in reason. Even
states like California that authorize local governments to define their own
legitimate ends require that exercises of the police power be "reasonable
in object." ' 6 It is not sufficient for a local government to articulate any end
for its actions; some ends are valuable, others are not. 17
Yet state courts almost never declaim with any clarity where the
boundaries lie. As demonstrated in Part II, courts are more comfortable
scrutinizing the rationality of regulatory means than they are questioning
objectives or ends. They recognize that the act of choosing objectives
from among plural values is an inherently legislative action. Selection
of legitimate ends entails articulation of the community's purposes and
values." 8 This function should be left to democratic processes. 1 9 "It is
215 Ilya Somirt, Federalism and Propery Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL E 53, 63-70 (2011).
216 Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, I37 Cal. Rptr. 304,307-
08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). Significantly, the court in this case recited the canonical list of police
powers from Euclid. Id. at 3o8; see also Town of Atherton v. Templeton, 17 Cal. Rptr. 680,684
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
217 See Dawson Enter., Inc. v. Blaine Cnty., 567 P2d 1257 (Idaho 1977); Trust Co. of
Chi. v. City of Chi., 96 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. 1951); Kimball v. Blanchard, 7 A.2d 394, 396 (N.H.
1939) (condemning a zoning enactment as "purely a wastebasket process, absolutely arbitrary
and unreasonable").
218 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 150-53 (I98O) [hereinafter NATU-
RAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS]; JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY
OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 258-66 (2010). Obviously, there are limits. Some values ought to be, and
are, enshrined in constitutional doctrines so as to be out of reach of legislative enactments.
Those are beyond the scope of this article.
219 "The definition [of the police powerl.is essentially the product of legislative deter-
minations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor histori-
cally capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). As a state court expressed it, "we bear in mind the
general rule that the courts will not and cannot inquire into motives of members of a mu-
nicipal governing body or other zoning authority where the validity of zoning plans or laws is
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within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled."
'22 0
So the problem is clear. Only if police powers are exercised in favor
of intelligible values-goods whose value will be recognizable to all
reasonable minds--can they be authoritative. Yet courts are rightly reticent
to scrutinize legislative ends. The sensible solution is that state lawmakers
must do the work of articulating which ends are rational (and which are not)
and of distinguishing the important and fundamental ends from the less
important, or less fundamental ends. The balance of this article is devoted
to this solution. It considers two approaches in turn.
First, we will consider whether it is possible and advisable to draw the
line between individual rights, which are grounded in individual interests,
and collective interests. Liberal theories often draw some distinction like
this in order to determine when rights that conflict with collective interests
are inviolable and when they must be sacrificed. Because the ultimate ends
of human choice and action are incommensurable, when the interests at
stake are ultimate ends this approach proves unworkable and should not
be pursued.
Second, we will consider whether it is possible to avoid the dichotomy
between individual and collective interests in instances of ultimate ends.
This will require us to identify truly common goods that are good for all
and the value of which is knowable by all. To allow for the rich variety of
the aspects of human flourishing, these goods must be realized in plural
and various forms. To avoid the problem of incommensurability, these
goods must be instantiated not as a compromise of individual interests for
some "greater" collective good, but rather for the benefit of all those living
together in communities.
B. The False Dichotomy Between Individual Rights and Collective Interests
One understanding of the proper objects of the police powers might
be sought in the dichotomy between individual property rights and
collective interests. On this account, property rights are limited by some
form of collectivism, which seeks to maximize the preferences or interests
of the greatest number at the occasional expense of individual property
owners. This account rests upon consequentialist reasoning. It presupposes
that all human goods can be compared on a single scale and that political
decision-makers are at least sometimes more competent than landowners
to maximize human values. From this view, the state has the authority to
under consideration." Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City of Honolulu, 767 P.zd 815, 820 (Haw. 1989).
22o Bennan, 348 U.S. at 33.
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burden property rights because lawmakers must have power to produce
the greatest collective good for the greatest number of people.
Eduardo M. Pefialver is among the many prominent scholars who have
defended a collectivist account of property law."' l He would authorize
state usurpation of property rights when "collective decision making" can
be expected to "generate outcomes superior to individually determined
conduct." ' Other prominent property scholars also assert on collectivist
grounds that property is something to be managed by the state.2 3 They
doubt that property owners can be trusted to use assets wisely for the
greater good and would like, therefore, to give law and government a strong
deliberative role in determining the uses of property.2 4 On their view,
property-owner sovereignty should survive as an institution only to the
extent that it can be shown to be more effective than regulation directed at
promoting collective ends. 2 5
A competing account of property law is found on the other side of the
divide between the state and the individual. Law and economics scholars
tend, on the whole, to favor individual property-owner sovereignty because
economics teaches that private property is generally better than collective
decision-making at managing resources. On this ground, contemporary
property rights theorists defend a strong core of owner sovereignty, which
enjoys justificatory priority to the state. 2 6 They observe that the law protects
this core with strong sanctions; the owner has a right to exclude, enforceable
against the whole world. They argue that property rights must be robust if
property is to serve as a coordination device, efficiently assigning rights and
responsibilities for the disposition of assets among individuals.
At first glance, the collectivist account and the economic account appear
to be in direct opposition to each other. On closer examination, however,
221 See Eduardo M. Pefhalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
222 Id. at 870.
223 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REv.
743, 743-44 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 749, 8i9 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property,
94 CORNELL L. REV. Io63, 1063-64 (2oO9); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 821 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Demo-
cratic Society, 94 CORNELL L, REV. I1O9, I061--62 (2009).
224 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 Cornell L. Rev.
743, 744 (2009); Pefhalver, supra note 221, at 847-856, 886. This idea of course has a rich his-
tory. Different variations of it can be found in thinkers as varied as Rousseau, Proudhon, and
Marx. See KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (ed. En-
gels 19o6); PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? (Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G.
Smith, eds. & trans., Cambridge 1994); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY,
IN PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 31 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Oxford 1978).
225 Pefhalver, supra note 221, at 870.
226 See the articles and essays collected in ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Richard Ep-
stein ed. 2007). See also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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they share much in common. Both are essentially consequentialist accounts
of the institution of property. Both pose a dichotomy between the interests
of individual property owners and the collective interests of the state. Even
those law and economics scholars who defend property-owner sovereignty
seem to accept that property and human virtue are in some tension with
each other."2 7 Though they sometimes speak of "the moral nature" of
property rights, they do not claim that moral intuitions about property are
true, only that those intuitions are useful.2 8
These two consequentialist accounts of property predominate in
contemporary property scholarship.2 9 Thus, it should not surprise that
consequentialist accounts of the police powers have found considerable
favor in state law. 30 For example, in the famous case State v. Shack,1
31
the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to enforce a criminal trespass
provision against two men, Tejeras and Shack, who entered a farm without
the farmer's permission for the purpose of providing medical and legal
services to migrant workers who were residing there. 3 The text of the
statute clearly prohibited any trespass by one who was forbidden to enter
by the owner of the land,2 3  though it did not foreclose the argument that
Tejeras and Shack might be considered invitees of the migrant workers,
and therefore not trespassers. But the court insisted that "Property rights
serve human valuesZ 34 and that "[a] man's right in his real property of
course is not absolute." 35 The maxim that one should use his property
so as not to injure others expresses the "inevitable proposition that rights
227 Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Properly Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 889,
891 (2009).
228 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. t849, 1852-70 (2007).
229 A third set of accounts, based on something like natural rights, is making something
of a comeback. Scholars in this group are trying to build a theory of natural property rights
that avoids the errors often associated with John Locke. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Locke Unlocked:
Productive Use in Trespass, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory, GEORGE MASON L. & ECON.
RES. PAPER SERIES No 12-21, Feb. 10, 20 11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id= 1759551; Edward Feser, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Private Property,
LIBERTY FORUM (March 18, 2012), http://libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/natural-law-natu-
ral-rights-and-private-property/. This article does not defend natural rights theories of prop-
erty, though some of those theories might be consistent with the generally perfectionist ac-
count set out below.
23
o The state enabling acts in Hawaii and Michigan require that the zoning powers be
exercised "to ensure the greatest benefit" for or to "the State as a whole." HAW. REV. STAT. §4
6-4(a) (West 2012); MIcH. COMP. LAwS § 324.30510 (2012).
231 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
232 Id. at 370.
233 Id.
234"1d. at 372.
235 Id. at 373-
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
are relative and there must be an accommodation when they meet."13 6 Of
course this is true, but the court did not make any effort to examine what
human values the landowner might be serving by exercising his right to
exclude. No doubt the court reasonably inferred that the landowner did
not have the best interests of his employees at heart. But the court did
not reveal the calculus underlying its conclusion that allowing the trespass
better served the greatest good for the greatest number.
The high court of Illinois has also accepted the putative dichotomy
between individual rights and collective interests. 37 In reversing a city's
refusal to re-zone a tract from residential to commercial, the court offered
a consequentialist calculation as justification. 3 The landowner-claimant
sought to sell his tracts to an oil company that would build an automobile
service station.239 The court ruled that the city's refusal to re-zone was
contrary to the "public interest" in light of the "uses and zoning of nearby
property," the diminution of property values, "the benefits sought to be
attained by the ordinance," and "the relative gain to the public as compared
to the hardship imposed upon the property owner."24 The court saw its
task as one of calculating the net collective gain or loss from the land use
decision: "If the public gain is small when compared with the hardship
imposed upon the individual property owner, the restriction constitutes an
unreasonable exercise of the police power."
' ' 41
Oddly, however, the court made no attempt to perform the actual
calculation. The court did not quantify the potential gains or losses caused
by the refusal to re-zone. It would seem reasonable to infer that converting
the tracts from residential use to use as a fuel and service station would
result in a substantial increase in traffic. But the court did not require
the landowner to rebut this inference; it held that the city had made no
"showing that the residential classification is necessary ... from a traffic
standpoint[.] ' '1 41 The court then summarily declaimed that "the public
interest to be served is either nonexistent or insignificant when compared
with the injury [to the landowner.]
2 43
Because the court declined to show its figures and calculations, its
reasoning might remain opaque were it not for a throw-away line in the
236 Id.
237 Tillitson v. City of Urbana, 193 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ill. 1963); see also Rockford Blacktop
Constr. Co. v. Cnty. of Boone, 635 N.E.2d 1077 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
238 Tillitson, 193 N.E.2d at 2-4.
239 Id. at 3.
240 Id. at 3-4.
241 Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted). This sort of balancing is reminiscent of that man-
dated by the Court for regulatory takings cases in Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
242 Tillitson, 193 N.E.2d at 4.
243 Id.
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middle of the opinion. The court inferred from the record "that plaintiff's
property is being accorded different treatment from other property similarly
situated."'2 44 The record showed "neither uniformity, nor a long-established
adherence to the residential classification" in the neighborhood . 4 This is,
of course, not a conclusion reached as a result of measuring costs against
benefits. It is not a matter of whether the landowner's property rights should
be sacrificed for some greater, collective good. This is instead a judgment
about equal protection or fundamental fairness. So it appears that the
Illinois court set up a pretense of consequentialist calculations. The real
reason for its decision appears to have been some fundamental principle
of justice. This is a principle which stands apart from consequentialist
accounts of property.
Indeed, there is much about the institution of property that collectivist
and purely economic accounts of property fail to explain, particular with
respect to ultimate ends. Collectivism cannot explain property's robust
pluralism. Property serves the common good in as many different ways
as there are property owners. Just as one person's notion of the good life
differs from his neighbor's notion, one person's use of his assets to pursue
the good life differs from his neighbor's use. Most choices about the use of
property are governed by pre-moral considerations. That is, absent some
moral constraint, one may choose among a variety of equally reasonable
uses of property. Some people use property to raise and support families;
others use property to pursue education and knowledge; others donate
property to charitable causes. That different people use property to pursue
different aspects of the good is one of property's great strengths. Property
is, in this sense, one of the truly pluralistic institutions in American law.
Meanwhile, economic accounts of property cannot explain the
rationality of regulatory limitations upon property rights for non-economic
ends, even where they concede the value of such limitations. Economists
cannot fully explain aesthetic regulation. Nor can they explain moral harm.
Accepting that one should not use one's property to injure another person,
to destroy the natural environment, to expose children to obscenity, or
to harm another's property rights even (or especially) if it would be most
efficient to do so is to accept a normative claim which must appeal to some
reason beyond efficiency.
Any theory that reduces ultimate values to individual interests or
collective aggregates of interests will also pay insufficient attention to
practices and institutions directed toward realizing truly common goods.
Property serves common goods in part by creating space for communities
to collaborate. Property is owned and used not only by individuals but also





individual property owners can and do choose to use their property for the
benefit not only of themselves but also of others: children benefit from the
property ownership of their parents; the destitute benefit from charitable
gifts; employees benefit from capital investments in the corporations that
employ them.
These examples illustrate that the dichotomy between allowing
individuals to serve their own interests and authorizing the state to promote
collective interests is incomplete. Even as it enables pluralism, property-
owner sovereignty serves a truly common good, which is reducible neither
to individual interests nor to collective political decisions. Participation
in the common good is an exercise of practical reasonableness, with
implications for both pre-moral and moral choosing. In other words, there
is a lot more going on in property than consequentialists recognize.
The failure of consequentialist accounts of property to account for
much of the work that property law is really doing should not be surprising,
for consequentialism has been discredited in moral and legal philosophy
as a way of measuring ultimate ends. z46 The best jurisprudential thinkers
from both the liberal tradition and the natural law tradition agree that basic
human values are plural and incommensurable, and a choice between
basic human goods is thus undetermined by reason.147 It makes no sense
to compare the value of, say, a human life with the value of knowledge.
There is no common scale on which such basic, fundamental human values
can be compared with each other. 48 Thus, as a strategy of answering the
question, What ought to be done?, "utilitarianism or consequentialism is
irrational."1
49
C. A Theory of Police Powers
1. Lessons From Contemporary Perfectionist Jurisprudence.-Because the
individual-collective distinction is not helpful for understanding ultimate
reasons for action, it is productive to examine another theory of state
interests. This theory is drawn from an old tradition which has enjoyed a
contemporary revitalization in the work of a variety of legal philosophers
246 FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS I I -8 (1980); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MO-
RALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986) [hereinafter MORALITY OF FREEDOM]; G.E.M. Anscombe,
Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958) (first defining the term "consequentialism").
247 JOHN FINNIS, MoRAL ABSOLUTES: ThADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 58 (1991); JOSEPH
RAZ, TtE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 388-89 (1986).
248 This is known as the incommensurability thesis, and it has been most persuasively
defended by Joseph Raz and John Finnis. See, e.g., MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, chs.
I 1-13; NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18, at 112-18,
249 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, Supra note 218, at 1 12
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that includes the liberals Ronald Dworkin 5 ' and Joseph Raz 5lt as well
as natural lawyer John Finnis. 52 This older tradition is sometimes called
"perfectionism," '53 and sometimes the "Central Tradition." ' 4 The basic
idea underlying the older tradition is that human action can be rationally
grounded in human goods that are both good for all and intelligible to all.
These common goods ground the rationality not only of individual choices
but also of political actions and law. They also make sense of communal
actions through intermediary institutions, such as marriage, family, trade
guilds, and, importantly, property ownership.
Though no list of human goods enjoys universal assent, the list of
basic goods identified by John Finnis represents the most comprehensive
inventory.55 In his landmark work, Finnis identified seven human goods
that are common to all and good for all, the value of which is self-evident and
therefore known to all. He enumerated life (including health), knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, sociability (or friendship, or community, or, as
Joseph Raz would put it, "living in a society" 5 6), practical reasonableness,
and order with ultimate reality (what Finnis, "summarily and lamely" in his
words, called "religion").
2 57
The value of a basic good is not absolute but it is intrinsic, meaning that
it is not contingent upon anything more basic than itself. From the basic
goods all other human goods derive their value. So, for example, money,
which is not a basic good, has rational, instrumental value insofar as it
enables one to instantiate one or more of the basic goods. Money buys food,
which supports life. It is effective to purchase health care, which serves
the good of health. 5 8 And so on. The value of instrumental goods, such as
250 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (201 I).
251 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 203-07.
252 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218.
253 ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY ch.
1(0993).
254 Id.
255 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18.
256 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 2o6.
257 Id. In a later writing, Finnis provided a slightly modified list, identifying the basic
goods as (1) knowledge; (2) skillful performance in work and play; (3) bodily life and the
components of its fullness, such as health and safety; (4) friendship and association between
persons; (S) conjugal marriage; (6) practical reasonableness; and (7) "harmony With the widest
reaches and most ultimate source of all reality, including meaning and value." John Finnis,
Liberalism and NaturalLaw Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687,691-92 (1994) [hereinafter Liberal-
ism and NaturalLaw].
258 This basic goods approach provides a superior explanation of the State v. Shack, 277
A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) case, discussed supra Part III.B. ThatTejeras and Shack entered the farm
to provide medical and legal services suggests that they intended to serve the health of the
migrant workers there, and to protect their rights. Health is of course an aspect of the basic
good of life. Justice is entailed in the requirements of practical reasonableness. NATURAL LAW
& NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218, at chs. 7 & 8. Owner sovereignty gives way when it is used
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money, is thus contingent upon its use to realize the value of more basic
goods, such as life and health. The basic goods thus supply the ultimate
rationality of every human action.
Just as every rational human action is ultimately grounded in one or
more basic goods, every rational state action finds its ultimate rationality
in creating or protecting the conditions in which the basic goods can
be realized. Traffic regulations promote order on the highways. Order
instrumentally serves the basic goods of life and community. State schools
are designed to promote knowledge, while subsidies for the arts support
the creation of beautiful works, enabling aesthetic experience.
Land use regulations are no different in this respect. The state interests
identified in Village of Euclid-health, safety, morals, and general welfare-
and the state interests identified in various state enabling acts are rational
because they are directed toward (1) the coordinated action within the
community which establishes the conditions in which property use
promotes the common good, and (2) protection of the human goods that
irresponsible land use is most likely to jeopardize-particularly human life,
bodily health, and practical reasonableness (especially the moral character
of children). 59 To this list many states add aesthetics,w' notwithstanding
to threaten basic human goods, such as health and practical reasonableness.
259 Preventing moral harm is a valid basis for zoning regulation. City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral
Harm, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1673-74 (2005). On prevention of moral harm as a valid police
power generally, see GEORGE supra note 253, at i8o; Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography,
Morality, and Harm: Why Miller Should Survive Lawrence, iS GEo. MASON L. Rav. 611 (2008);
Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM J. JURis. 65 (2000).
On moral harm as a basis for nuisance liability, see John Copeland Nagle, MoralNuisances, 5o
EMORY L.J. 265 (2001).
26o City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364,367 (Fla. I941) (stating that
in certain communities, aesthetics are so necessary to the public welfare that aesthetic reasons
alone justify zoning regulations); Warren v. City of Marietta, 288 S.E.zd 562, 564 (Ga. 1982);
State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825, 827 (Haw. 1967) (holding a zoning ordinance is
valid if reasonably necessary and appropriate for accomplishment of an aesthetic objective;
the ordinance does not need to also be based on economics, health, safety, or morality); R.H.
Gump Revocable Trust v. City of Wichita, 131 P.3d 1268, 1275-76 (Kan, Ct. App. 2oo6); John
Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Mass. 1975); Asselin v. Town
of Conway, 6z8 A.2d 247, 250 (N.H. 1993); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield,
324 A.zd 113, 1i19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Al-
buquerque, 646 P.2d 565, 571 (N.M. 1982) (holding aesthetics are "inextricably intertwined"
with general welfare, and alone, aesthetics provide a valid basis for zoning regulations); People
v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y. 1963); State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675,681 (N.C. 1982); Vill.
of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ohio 1984). But see, e.g., State v. Kievman,
165 A. 6oi, 604 (Conn. 1933) (stating a board may create zoning ordinances relying on aes-
thetic considerations in connection with other, recognized police powers); La Salle Nat'l Bank
v. City of Evanston, 312 N.E. 2d 625, 634 (II1. 1974) (stating that aesthetic considerations have
been recognized, but alone, are not controlling in zoning cases); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of
Des Moines, 78 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Iowa 1956) ("Aesthetic consideration can be said to enter
into the matter as an auxiliary consideration where the zoning regulation has a real or reason-
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the difficulty inherent in defining and regulating architectural beauty' 61
Other states identify as values the basic goods of life 6 and community,
in family.2 63 Still other states identify instrumental goods that are directly
derived from basic goods. Fundamental fairness164 is a constituent aspect of
practical reasonableness or morality. Peace and good order2 65 are essential
preconditions of the realization of complex basic goods, such as friendship
and aesthetic experience.
State action in protection of these goods is not arbitrary but rationally
grounded in goods that are shared by all whom the state governs, both
those whom any particular state action appears to benefit and those whose
actions the state action restricts. If life is better than death, and health is
better than sickness, one who is coercively restrained from polluting water
sources is coerced into living in a community that is objectively better both
for everyone else andforhim as a result of the coercive state action.
The basic good of health supplies the rationality of many land use
regulations. Segregating industrial enterprises (such as electric power
generation plants and sewage treatment plants) from public assembly
spaces (such as schools, churches, and concert halls) minimizes the general
population's exposure to toxins and pollutants. Building codes, ordinances
requiring traffic safety devices in residential developments, flood plain
restrictions, and a host of other local laws prevent harm to the health of
citizens. The state must have the power to enact all of these land use
controls.
Just as important, the state should not have the power to act for ends
that have no intelligible grounding in basic goods or, worse, actually
impede the realization of basic goods. All things being equal, a zoning code
able relation to the safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the community."); Coscan
Wash., Inc. v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 590 A.2d io8o, 1087-88 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, i99 N.W.zd 525, 529 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1972); City of Jackson v. Bridges, 139 So. 2d 660, 664 (Miss. 1962); Newman Signs, Inc. v.
Hjelle, 268 N.W.'d 741,757 (N.D. 1978);White Adver. Metro, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 453
A.2d 29,35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 168 S.E.2d 117, 120-21 (Va.
1969); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 578 P.ad 1309, 1315 (Wash. 1978).
261 On the history of aesthetic regulation, see Meg Stevenson, Aesthetic Regulations: A
History, 35 REAL EsT. L.J. 519 (2007); see also J.F. Ghent, Zoning-Aesthetic Objectives or Consid-
erations as Affecting Validity of Zoning Ordinance, 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968); Kenneth Pearlman et
al., Beyond The Eye of The Beholder Once Again: A New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 UaB. LAW.
S1119 (2oo6); Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic
Zoning andArchitectural Reviea, 58 FORDHAm L. Rav. 10 13 (1990).
262 HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 46-1.5(13), 4(a) (West 2012).
263 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.69 (West 2011 ).
264 UTAH CODE ANN. § Io-9a-102(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
265 ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-403 (1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-115 (aoi0); 16 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 5226 (West 200); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-71o(A) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §




that excluded theaters or music halls would be arbitrary and irrational. This
is not because people have a fundamental constitutional right to attend
theatrical or musical productions. Rather, the limitation is inherent in the
police powers themselves. A zoning code that arbitrarily prevents citizens
from realizing the basic good of aesthetic experience defies reason.
2. Answering Some Critics.-The most common criticism of the Central
Tradition is that it wrongly attempts to derive the right from a prior account
of the good. People disagree about what is good, the criticism goes, so how
can any list of universal goods be discerned which will be fair to all? If
we were to articulate principles of justice on which all would agree, and
if we were to do so on neutral terms in a position of equality, we would
not consider any "conceptions of the good."' 66 Any attempt to derive rights
from a robust account of goods must privilege the goods of some people
over the goods of others in violation of fundamental fairness. Instead,
people must be free to create or determine their own values.1
67
This so-called "anti-perfectionist" 68 criticism has a number of fatal
problems. First, it rests upon a misapprehension of the claim to which
it is supposed to respond. Perfectionists do not claim that everyone
actually agrees that knowledge, life, religion, and the rest are basic goods.
Perfectionists instead claim that anyone can perceive the intelligible value
of these goods for their own sake (without reference to any goods more
fundamental than themselves) and can therefore perceive the rationality
of acting in pursuit of them. Though any individual certainly need not
agree with every instantiation of religion, for example (one might find the
claims of Islam more plausible than the claims of Scientology), any person
can see the rationality of making an effort to answer ultimate questions
about existence and meaning in the universe. One who makes no attempt
to answer those questions is, in a sense, missing out on a rich, worthwhile
experience. In other words, though one can reasonably claim that certain
basic goods are more reasonably instantiated in some forms than in others,
no one can reasonably claim that ignorance is better than knowledge, that
chaos is better than order, that sickness is better than health.
Additionally, the anti-perfectionist criticism misunderstands
perfectionist jurisprudential claims about the common good. Perfectionism
actually provides a much stronger foundation for pluralism than does anti-
perfectionism. That some goods are intrinsically and objectively valuable
does not entail that those goods must be instantiated or realized in every
action. Basic goods provide ultimate reasons for action-they supply
266 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE I I (rev. ed., 1999).
267 The reader will recognize this necessarily short summary as a (crude) statement of
the position of anti-perfectionist liberals, such as John Rawls and David A.J. Richards. See a/so
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
268 GEORGE, supra note 253, at ch. 5; MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at ch. 5.
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intelligible ends toward which to aim one's actions. But though basic
goods are intrinsically valuable, they are not absolute. That some good is
intrinsically valuable-basically good-does not, mean that it must always
be realized or even preserved. 69 It does entail, however, that one always
can articulate a reason to realize or preserve it, that one has an obligation
to refrain from deliberately destroying it, and that one ought to respect
another's participation in it.210
The anti-perfectionist critics fundamentally misconceive the nature of
pluralism. Strict neutrality is impossible in political life.",' Thus, the anti-
perfectionist attempt to build a theory of justice on neutral grounds is itself
not neutral as between competing conceptions of human persons and the
good."2 A better approach is to recognize that human goods are varied and
plural and that basic human goods are all equally basic. Thus, all human
goods provide equally compelling reasons for action, even when one
cannot pursue all of them in one choice or act. 73 For this reason, different
life plans can be, and are, equally reasonable and valuable. 7 4 Yet it is also
true that some choices and actions are simply not reasonable, not valuable,
because they are not made consistent with a reasonable respect for the
good. 7 s These choices can be eliminated (even coercively) consistent
269 So, for example, John Keown has helpfully explained the difference between a prin-
ciple of "vitalism," which holds that it is always wrong either to shorten the life of a human
being or to fail to strive to lengthen it, and a "sanctity of life" principle, which holds that
human life has intrinsic value and is entitled to protection from unjust attack. John Keown,
The Legal Revolution: From "Sanctity of Life" to "Quality of Life" and "Autonomy", 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PO'Y 253, 256-57 (1998). Whereas the vitalism principle requires that human life
be preserved at all costs, and is therefore ethically untenable and physically unrealistic, the
principle of the sanctity of human life forbids the deliberate destruction of innocent human
life. Id. at 256-58.
270 See generally FIsNIS, supra note 2 1.
271 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 117-30.
272 GEORGE, supra note 253, at 130-39. George explains the root of the problem:
The practical reasoning of parties in [Rawls'] original position turns out to be dis-
tinctively anti-perfectionist liberal practical reasoning: practical reasoning which
treats wants as reasons. The 'persons' in the original position are persons precisely
as they are conceived by anti-perfectionist liberalism. A person conceived oth-
erwise would (or at least could) act, not on sheer wants, but on what critics of
anti-perfectionism take to be basic reasons [including basic goods] (that are not
reducible to wants).... [B]asic reasons for action are provided by those intelligible
benefits (which, from the perspective of the person acting, or contemplating action,
to realize them, are intelligiblepurposes) which fulfill human persons, thus constitut-
ing the human good.
Id. at 137-38. George notes that "the question, 'Is it always good for one to get what one
wants?' is a genuine question (and need not use some narrowly 'moral' sense of good)." Id.
at 138.
273 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218, at 92-95.
274 Id. at 93-94; MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 133,369-99.
275 NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218, at 100-27; MORALITY OF FREE-
DOM, supra note 246, at 380-81.
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with the demands of pluralism and of personal autonomy. 76 Thus, far from
being absolutist, the basic goods (or common good) approach provides the
strongest explanation and justification for both human freedom (which
collectivism cannot explain) and constraints on individual autonomy
(which individualist accounts cannot explain).
Finally, anti-perfectionist critics fail to consider how knowledge of goods
is attained. 77 Finnis and others affirm that the value of the basic goods can
be grasped through non-inferential acts of human reasoning; 78 the value
of basic goods cannot be deduced or inferred from more fundamental ends
because there are no more fundamental ends. "Each [good] is a basic,
irreducible form of human opportunity, good for its own sake." '79 That the
intrinsic value of basic goods such as knowledge is self-evident means
that the value of these goods cannot be demonstrated,"8 ° but it also entails
that their value needs no demonstration."' The knowledge of the value
of basic goods is thus non-inferential.82 Everyone knows that knowledge,
for example, simply is better than ignorance. No amount of rationalization
for any particular act of hostility or indifference to knowledge can erase
knowledge's intrinsic value.
Finnis observes that, in moving from an inclination toward knowledge
to a grasp of its self-evident value, "[o]ne finds oneself reflecting that
ignorance and muddle are to be avoided, simply as such and not merely in
relation to a closed list of questions that one has raised." ' 3 One recognizes
that a "well-informed and clear-headed person" is well-off, not merely
because he can make instrumental use of his knowledge and profit from
it, but simply because it is good for everyone to know."8 This holds not
merely for oneself and one's own interests, "but at large." 5
The intrinsic value of knowledge explains why no one can reasonably
question the rationality of state actions that effectively provide for the
education of children. An exercise of the police powers that is reasonably
276 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 380-8 1.
277 Rawls objected to utilitarianism not on the ground that basic human goods are in-
commensurable, but rather that the intelligibility of common goods is an illusion. He insisted,
"[slimply because we do in fact make what we call interpersonal comparisons of well-being
does not mean that we understand the basis of these comparisons or that we should accept
them as sound." RAWLS, supra note z66, at 78. Rawls set out his thin conception of the good-
derived from his so-called "primary social goods"-in order to "establish objective grounds
for interpersonal comparisons." Id. at 79.
278 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18, at 64-69.
279 Liberalism andNaturalLaw, supra note 257, at 691.
28o NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18, at 6S.
z81 Id.
282 Id. at 65-69.
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directed toward the basic good of knowledge appeals to rational minds.
And knowledge is valuable for everyone in the community, not merely for
those who can make the most profitable use of it.
It is worthwhile to observe here that natural law philosophers are not
alone in defending the unconditional, universal value of at least some
basic goods. Like Finnis, the perfectionist liberal philosopher Joseph Raz
also holds that some goods are both common and intrinsically good. 86
"At the very least," insists Raz, the common good of living in society "is
on this view intrinsically good." '87 Social living is thus a good equally as
basic as personal autonomy; the value of one is not derived from, and is
therefore not contingent upon, the value of the other. Raz believes that
the ideal of personal autonomy is for this reason "incompatible with moral
individualism.
'2 88
Because basic goods are plural but not individualistic, courts and citizens
can grasp the rationality of laws that promote coordinated action within
communities. Zoning codes that segregate residential neighborhoods
from industrial uses, permit provisions that provide for schools and public
assemblies, and reservations that set aside space for parks and common
areas all promote a truly common good.
Apart from anti-perfectionist worries, a second, stronger criticism of the
Central Tradition is that the basic goods approach is insufficiently attuned
to the plurality of moral values. 8 9 Perhaps some things truly are better
than others, these critics concede. Perhaps knowledge, for example, truly is
better than ignorance. But people should still choose. The value of basic
goods is realized through the exercise of personal autonomy, and coercive
action, by destroying personal autonomy, destroys the other basic goods as
well. One must be free to choose good ends; otherwise those ends are not
good."' A life lived autonomously simply is better than a life lived without
autonomy, these critics contend. 9' People must therefore be free to make
their own lives, consistent with the demands of moral pluralism.9 2
This second criticism, one predicated on moral pluralism, presupposes
that the value of all basic goods is contingent upon those goods being freely
chosen. But this is not true. While some goods-e.g. friendship, religion-
can be realized only through the exercise of personal autonomy, other
goods are valuable whether or not freely chosen.293 The value of goods such
286 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 206.
287 Id.
z88 Id.
289 See DWORKIN, supra note'25o, at 205-06.
290 ANDY OLREE, THE CHOICE PRINCIPLE: THE BIBLICAL CASE FOR LEGAL TOLERATION
136-38, 147 (2006).
291 MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 369-99.
292 Id. at 395-99.
293 Adam J. MacLeod, The (Contingent) Value of Autonomy and the Reflexivity of (Some) Basic
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as life and knowledge is not conditional, not contingent upon any exercise
of personal autonomy. For this reason, states have built many coercive laws
around the protection of these goods. 94
The moral pluralism criticism also misunderstands what it means that
the basic goods are common goods. The basic goods are common in more
than one sense. Finnis observes that all human societies show concern for
these goods, or some forms or instantiations of these goods, and the practical
principles that guide their realization. 95 Though no value is recognized at
all times, in all places, in the same way, anthropologists find with "striking
unanimity" that the basic goods are known to all societies in some way.
296
The basic goods are "good for any and every person." 97
The basic goods are also common in the sense that participation in
them is not an exclusively individual project, but rather something that a
human being does together with other human beings, in community, for his
own good and for the good of the others. 98 Realization of the basic goods is
a project of cooperation and common commitment among people.2 99 Thus,
the "common good" is not collective in the utilitarian sense of the greatest
aggregate good for the greatest number3°° which necessarily contradicts
or overrides the goods (and personal autonomy) of individuals.3 °" Rather,
Goods, 5 J. JURISPRUDENCE, Jan. 2009, at I I, 38.
294 See generally Adam J. MacLeod, The Mystery of Life in the Laboratory of Democracy: Per-
sonalAutonomy in State Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 589 (2011).
295 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218, at 83-84.
296 Id. at 83; see also C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN app. 56-64 (Geoffery Blessing
1946).
297 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18, at 155.
298 Id. at 154-56. The mutuality of basic goods is seen clearly in the basic good of friend-
ship. "For [A] to be [B]'s friend, [A] must act (at least in substantial part) for the sake of [B]'s
well-being, and must value [Bl's well-being for the sake of [B]. [A] must treat [Bl's well-be-
ing as an aspect of his [As] own wel-being." Id. at i4z-43. But the same is also true of B. "it
follows that A must value A's own well-being for the sake of B, while B must value B's own
well-being for the sake of A. And so on. The reciprocity of love does not come to rest at either
pole." Id. at 143.
299 Id. at 134-6o.
300 Id. at 154. Because the basic goods are incommensurable, this consequentialist cal-
culation is unworkable, incoherent, and irrational. Id. at I i1-18; MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra
note 246, at 321-66.
301 For example, the good of an individual party to a promise is not distinct from, but
rather is part of, the common good of all parties who have an interest in the promise. Finnis
explains:
[Olne acts most appropriately for the common good, not by trying to estimate
the needs of the common good 'at large' but by performing one's contractual un-
dertakings, and fulfilling one's other responsibilities, to ascertained individuals, i.e.
to those who have particular rights correlative to his duties. Fulfilling one's par-
ticular obligations in justice, even within the restricted sphere of private contracts,
family responsibilities, etc., is necessary if one is to respect and favour the common
good, not because 'otherwise everyone suffers', or because non-fulfillment would
diminish 'overall net good' in some impossible utilitarian computation, or even
because it would 'set a bad example' and thus weaken a useful practice, but simply
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the "common good" refers to "the factor or set of factors ... which, as
considerations in someone's practical reasoning, would make sense of or give
reason for that individual's collaboration with others and would likewise,
from their point of view, give reason for their collaboration with each other
and with that individual."3 °0 In political communities, the common good,
which consists of communal participation in the basic goods, is a "justified
meaning of the phrases 'the general welfare' or 'the public interest.""'3 3
3. State Interests Grounded in Basic Goods.-If indeed the "common good
of communities" is a reasonable way to understand what courts mean by
the phrases "the general welfare" and "the public interest," then it is not a
stretch to infer that the police powers are most justifiable when exercised
in defense or preservation of the common good. Just as individual persons
and private associations have rational interests in instantiating basic
goods,3" states have rational interests in protecting and preserving "a set
of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for
themselves reasonable objectives," which have their intelligible value in
the human goods of "life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship,
religion, and freedom in practical reasonableness"-basic goods which are
"good for any and every person."30
One perceives traces of this common-good account of state police
powers in pre-Euclid United States Supreme Court decisions and in post-
Euclid state law. Revisiting the Mugler decision, one finds Justice Harlan
affirming the power of the state to exercise the police powers not for the
interests of the state itself, nor for the collective benefit of the greatest
number at the expense of individual rights, but to protect from injury
the "interests of the community,"3 6 to "promote the common good."3 7
Harlan recognized that the state does not have power over all actions that
legislation might reach.30 8 Of course, the Constitution imposes external
limits,3" but Harlan asserted that the police powers contained their own
because the common good is the good of individuals, living together and depend-
ing upon one another in ways that favour the well-being of each.
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 18, at 305.
302 Id. at 154.
303 Id. at 156.
304 This is the justification for private property in the first instance. See Adam J. Ma-
cLeod, Private Property and Human Flourishing, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (October 25, 2ol I), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/20 I I o/1/3648.
305 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 218, at 155.
306 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 (1887).
307 Id. at 663.
308 "It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of
these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state. There




internal limitations; they were limited by reason. The police powers are
limited to certain intelligible interests that all within the community share
and that all can recognize-interests in "the public morals, the public
health, or the public safety."31 The state cannot rightly enact a law that has
"no real or substantial relation to those objects."3"'
By implication, the state does not enjoy unfettered discretion to decide
what is best for the community. It is bound by reason, 31 2 the same reason
that citizens governed by the state exercise to ascertain what is good. So
how does one explain the need for coercive legislation if both the state and
its citizens are bound by reason? In short, not all citizens act fully reasonably
all the time. For example, some people pollute. Harlan expected threats
to the state's interest to come from those who do not follow reason, who
do not respect universal common goods and who regard "only their own
appetites or passions."
31 3
The Court in Euclid did not take Harlan's conception of the police
powers as wholly axiomatic. 34 But nothing in the Euclid decision detracted
from the force of Justice Harlan's observations about the proper purposes
of, and limitations on, the police powers. Indeed, insofar as the Euclid Court
allowed for the possibility of as-applied challenges, it implicitly recognized
that a particular exercise of a police power might be so unreasonable as
to be unlawful, or might cease to be an exercise of the police power and
become some other act, such as an act of eminent domain.3 5
State courts also appeal to a common good, which is reducible neither to
private, individual interests nor to some collective good-for-the-greatest-
number. In striking down a regulation that excluded from a child-free
residential neighborhood a church where children would attend, the Indiana
high cotirt stated that "[t]he education, morally and spiritually of children,
is a matter of great public concern" and that the interests of children
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Harlan suggested that the authority to coerce presupposes reasonable grounds for
the coercion. "No one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon reasonable
grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general welfare." Id. at 663.
313 Id. at 66o.
314 For one thing, Justice Sutherland insisted that reasonableness and unreasonableness
had as much to do with context as with what he termed "abstract consideration of... the thing
considered apart." Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). He colorfully
remarked, "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard." Id. This is consistent with the perfectionist theory advanced in this
article, which holds that not all rational choices are fully reasonable. Reasonableness requires
consideration of all relevant considerations. For a property owner, one important consideration
is the effect one's use of one's property will have on one's neighbors.
315 This happens when the government action goes "too far," a limitation at which Jus-
tice Holmes hinted in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) and which he adopted while
writing for the Court in Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, z6o U.S. 393,415-16 (1922).
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constitute the "interest of the common good and general welfare.1
316
The education and moral development of children is a good shared by all
people who live in the community, including those who do not like having
children around. The court quoted the state constitution which "reminds
the General Assembly" of a self-evident truth, namely "that 'Knowledge
and learning, generally diffused throughout community"' is an essential
value.317 State lawmakers thus have an obligation to "encourage, by all
suitable means," moral and intellectual improvement.318
4. Substantiality of Interest Tied to Basic Goods.-As discussed above,
land use controls are sometimes deemed unlawful when they infringe
constitutionally-protected rights for purposes that are less than substantial,
or when they burden fundamental rights for reasons that are less than
compelling. Thus, any account of the state interests that underlie the
police powers must also explain the weightiness or substantiality of those
interests. The basic goods approach supplies a ready framework for this
work.
A robust examination of the common good reveals not only the
rationality of state interests but also why some state interests are considered
more compelling than others. Because basic goods are all equally basic, it
is incoherent to rank any basic good against any other basic good; the basic
goods are incommensurable.319 But basic goods can rationally be compared
to non-basic goods, those ends of human choice and action that are not
valuable in themselves but are merely instrumental in securing the more
fundamental goods from which they derive their value.
For example, human life is immeasurably more valuable than money.
For this reason it makes sense to claim that a municipality has a stronger,
weightier interest in preserving human life than it does in securing tax
revenues. Generating tax revenues is a rational state interest because money
is an instrumental good that enables the local government to protect and
secure basic goods, including human life. But revenue generation is not by
itself a substantial or compelling interest.3 0 By contrast, human life is itself
3 16 Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. 1961). The court took ju-
dicial notice that "churches and schools promote the common welfare and the general public
interest." Id. at 43.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 44.
319 According to the incommensurability thesis, to ask whether beauty is superior to
knowledge is akin to asking whether orange is brighter than the number three. See 13 MORAL-
ITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 246, at 321--66; NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note
218, at it i-18
320 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Similarly, traffic safety, which instrumentally serves the basic goods of
life and health, is a legitimate, though not compelling, interest. W. Paving Constr. Co. v. Jeffer-
son Cnty. Bd. of Coty. Comm'rs, 689 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Colo. App. 1984). Compatibility of uses
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a basic good and the state therefore has a compelling interest in preserving
it for its own sake.
32 1
We might hypothesize that compelling interests are those interests that
a municipality has in the direct protection and preservation of basic, as
opposed to non-basic (merely instrumental), human goods. It is instructive
that the interests that courts have found compelling generally focus
around the promotion and protection of basic goods.3"' The more direct
and managing the depletion of natural resources are likewise not compelling interests. Rocky
Mountain Christian Church v. Boulder Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1175 (D. Colo. 2oo9).
321 It is not surprising to find that the state has an "'unqualified interest in the preserva-
tion of human life,"' Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 28z (iq9o)), even very young human life. Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13, 163 (1973) (holding that the state's interest in
preserving life becomes compelling at the first moment of fetal viability). And the well-be-
ing of children has long been recognized as a compelling state interest. See Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002); see also Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989) (holding that the state has "a compelling interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors"); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3 d 240, 251 (3d Cir. zoo3;
Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999).
322 Compelling interests include several interests of local and state governments that are
related to the promotion and protection of aesthetics, education, morality, and religious exer-
cise, which are instances of basic human goods of aesthetic experience, knowledge, practical
reasonableness, and religion, respectively. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 675 (2004) (Stevens, J.
concurring) (protecting minors from exposure to sexual content); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 199 (1992) (preserving the integrity of the electoral process and of the citizenry's confi-
dence in the electoral system); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990) (preventing corruption); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (stu-
dents' learning); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. zoo8) (protecting minors from
exposure to sexual content on the internet); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 E3d 738,
746 (5th Cir. 2oo8) (protecting minors from exposure to sexual content); Jenevein v. Willing,
493 F3d 551 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (preserving the integrity of the judiciary); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 E3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2oo6) (protecting minors from exposure to
sexual content); Goodall v. Stafford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 930 F2d 3 6 3 , 3 70 (4th Cir. 199I) (avoiding
the establishment of religion); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 E2d 882, 889 (3d Cir. 199o)
(avoiding the establishment of religion); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.
1988) (adequately educating young citizens); Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y, 554 Ezd 534,
538 (2d Cir. 1977) (regulating the conduct of professionals); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 198
(ist Cir. 1973) (preserving the integrity of government and public servants); Harston v. Ky.
Transp. Cabinet, - S.W.3d -, 2011 WL 744542, *7 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished) (Ken-
tucky billboard restrictions supported by compelling state interests in promoting highway
safety and aesthetics). But see Midwest Media Prop., LLC v. Symmes Twp,. Ohio, 503 F3d
456, 476-78 (6th Cir. 2007) (no compelling interest in preservation of aesthetic and historic
structures); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F3d 1250, 1268 (i ith Cir. 2005)
(dicta) (no compelling interest in preservation of aesthetic and historic structures); Whitton v.
City of Gladstone, 54 F3d 1400, 14o8 (8th Cir. 1995) (no compelling interest in preservation
of aesthetic and historic structures); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13,
17 (N.M. 1964); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash.
1992) (no compelling interest in preservation of aesthetic and historic structures). One reason
why courts hesitate to declare aesthetics compelling might be that aesthetics are so difficult to
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the connection between the asserted state interest and the basic good that
supplies the ultimate rationality of the state action, the more compelling
the asserted state interest.
Contrast a community's interest in protecting its citizens from fatal
toxins with its interest in promoting economic growth. No one can
reasonably doubt that both interests are important, but are those interests
equally compelling? Protecting citizens from fatal toxins by (for example)
segregating sewage treatment plants from public assembly spaces directly
serves the basic good of health. Health is a basic good, intelligible as a
reason for action in itself and without reference to any more fundamental
end. It would be surprising for a court to find that a municipality's interest
in segregating sewage treatment plants from meeting halls-churches,
synagogues, Kiwanis clubs, etc.-was less than compelling.
By contrast, excluding a church from a business district in order to
increase the number of liquor licenses in that district might serve the good
of economic prosperity, but prosperity is not a basic good. One cannot
rationally claim to pursue money for its own sake. The intelligible value
of money rests in its exchange value, its capacity to enable its possessor to
acquire other, more fundamental ends, such as food or serviceable roads.
If this explains what courts are doing, we should not be surprised that
courts decline to recognize the increase of tax revenue as a compelling
state interest (or even a per se legitimate interest),3 3 particularly when




This is not to suggest that a community's interest in the preservation
of any particular instrumental good is unimportant. However, the case for
a state interest in the protection of a merely instrumental good is more
attenuated than that for protection of a basic good. 3 5 One can conceive
quantify objectively, and therefore are particularly likely to serve as pretextual justifications
for unlawful discrimination. But there is reason to believe that aesthetic considerations can
be objectively measured where they are tied to the specification of particular architectural
designs and styles.
323 Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P2d 1015, 1023 n.9 (Alaska 1996); Concerned Citi-
zens for McHenry, Inc. v. City of McHenry, 395 N.E.zd 944, 950 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) ("We
emphatically state that an increase in the tax base is not sufficient of itself to support re-zon-
ing.").
324 Cottonwood Chistian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. zd at 1228 (citing Jacobi v. Zoning Bd. of Ad-
justment, 196 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. 1964)).
325 Local authorities perhaps have a slightly less compelling interest in protecting a
church's neighbors from spillover parking and traffic hazards. See Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n,
148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 19o (D. Conn. 2ooi). Douglas Laycock "would concede that a commu-
nity has a compelling interest in not permitting a church (or any other place of assembly) to
regularly take over all the street parking in a neighborhood, making it difficult or impossible
for people to have guests or to park in front of their own homes. In the case of a church that
provides wholly inadequate parking for its membership, the compelling interest test is easy to
apply." Laycock, supra note 154, at 766.
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of cases where increasing tax revenues might be compelling, as where a
city is going broke and is in danger of having to suspend basic services,
such as police and fire protection. But note that the compelling nature of
the city's interest in this hypothetical does not rest on the value of the tax
revenues themselves but rather on the value of the more basic ends-life
and health-that the increased tax revenues is necessary instrumentally to
serve.
The basic goods account also makes sense of the judiciary's puzzlement
over aesthetic regulations. Consider a municipality's interest in ensuring
uniformity of building design in a commercial zone. Preserving visual
uniformity is not, in itself, a rational state interest. If the municipality
requires commercial establishments to be uniformly drab, uniformly
hideous, or uniformly distracting to passing motorists, then the municipality
has acted irrationally. Only if the uniformity serves an intelligible end, such
as making the commercial zone aesthetically pleasing, and thus serving
the basic good of beauty, can visual uniformity be said to be a rational
state interest. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
identified aesthetic appearance of a city as a substantial state interest.
32 6
Uniformity thus derives its value in its service to beauty, the more basic
good that it instrumentally serves. The substantiality of the municipality's
interest in visual uniformity varies according to how well the regulations
make the commercial zone more beautiful. Because courts are not in a
position to make this assessment they sometimes express reticence to
endorse aesthetic regulations. But they need not allow indeterminacy with
respect to means to cast doubt upon the substantiality of the state's interest
in the asserted end.
Other merely legitimate interests include: City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 126
(1981) (maintaining the essential flow of vehicular traffic); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 261 (198o) (protecting residents from the "ill effects of urbanization"); Viii. of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ("family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion"); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115-16 (maintaining the essential flow of vehicular traffic);Vill. of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (segregation of industrial from residential
uses); seealso Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 Ead 1369, 1375 (,1 th Cir. 1993).
Controlling traffic is one of the land use regulator's common goals. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392
(Density provisions, segregation of uses, and other zoning ordinances rest on the community's
interest in traffic safety). Butsee Solantic, LLC, 41o F3d at 1268 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (198)) (Traffic safety is at least one step removed from a
basic good such as health or life; traffic control is instrumentally valuable for securing more
basic ends, but is not an end in itself. And traffic safety has been deemed a substantial, but not
necessarily compelling, interest.); see also Bonita Media Enters. v. Collier Cnty. Code Enforce-
ment Bd., No. 2:0 7 -CV-41 I-FtM-z9DNF, 2008 WL 423449 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2oo8); Sava-
go v. Vill. of New Paltz, 214 E Supp. 2d 252, 259 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Traffic safety might become
a compelling interest for a community that suffers a disproportionate number of fatal traffic
accidents. However, that circumstance would present a fact question; the degree of compul-
sion would depend upon the directness between the harm to life and the regulation adopted.
326 Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 507-08; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 129 (978); Boraas, 416 U.S. at i8; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32 (i954).
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5. Basic Goods and Standards of Review.-Perfectionist theory pays yet
more dividends. In addition to explaining the rationality and substantiality
of state interests it also explains the means prong of judicial review. Just
as the substantiality of any particular state interest derives from the
directness with which it serves a basic good, the rationality of any particular
regulation adopted to serve the state interest derives from the directness
of its efficacy. Narrow tailoring, which is required in strict scrutiny review,
involves a very close connection between the regulatory means chosen
and the human good that the government is trying to preserve. Rational
relation, which is required in rational basis review, can involve a much
more attenuated connection. Thus, on this theory, both the ends prongs
and the means prongs of the various judicial review standards are designed
to measurethe directness between the community's stated goals and the
objective, intelligible ends of human choice and action to which those goals
correspond.
There remains, of course, the question of presumptions and burdens.
Three decades ago, the President's Commission on Housing recommended
that, "to increase the production of housing and lower its cost," states
should amend their enabling-acts to require that any zoning regulation
denying or limiting the development of housing rest upon a "vital and
pressing governmental interest" and to place the burden of proof on
the government.32 7 That proposal is commendable and is perhaps more
consistent with constitutional principles than the rules used today.3 But
the proposal outlined here need not go that far. The idea here is that,
whatever the standard of review and operating presumption, articulation
of a particular police power objective will make the land use decision more
transparent upon judicial review.3"9
III. A BRIEF SKETCH OF A PROPOSAL
Accepting the premise of basic human goods, what might states then
do to promote a truly common good and to avoid the confusion that results
from posing a false dichotomy between individual rights and collective
interests? I hope in a future article to create a proposed template that state
legislatures might follow. For now it must suffice to point to a few laudable
efforts that are already embodied in state law. States can enact meaningful
reform simply by amending the enabling acts that they already have.
Following Minnesota, states should require regulatory authorities to
state the reasons for their decisions contemporaneous with their decisions
and might attach to any subsequently-promulgated regulations without
327 Kmiec, supra note 207, at 20.
328 Id. at 21-24.




an accompanying statement a presumption of arbitrariness.330 Following
Arkansas, states should distinguish between land use decisions that are
truly general legislative enactments and those that are more judicial in
nature, particularly individualized assessments.33' As New Hampshire used
to do, states might allow trial courts to review individualized assessments
without any presumption of reasonableness.
3
1
In addition, following the New Hampshire legislature"' and the courts
of Kansas,334 state legislatures should articulate specific objectives that land
use regulators may pursue when acting in a truly legislative capacity. These
objectives should correspond to those conditions that states can create and
preserve to enable citizens to realize a truly common good. Because basic
goods are incommensurable, states should follow the lead of Rhode Island
and afford "equal priority '33s to the protection of each basic value and allow
local governments some freedom to prioritize objectives in their respective
master plans. 336 On the other hand, states should also make some effort
to identify which objectives it considers compelling, which it considers
substantial, and which it considers legitimate (and perhaps even those it
does not consider legitimate) according to the directness with which each
objective serves a basic humangood. Finally, following Ohio, states should
make some effort to identify which regulatory means it considers best
tailored to which legitimate regulatory objectives.
37
CONCLUSION
State legislatures would do courts, citizens, and themselves a favor by
articulating specific objectives for exercises of the police powers that regulate
land use. Specifying legitimate, substantial, and compelling interests that
correspond to the plural forms of the common good and requiring local
governments to identify which of those interests they are pursuing in each
regulatory act would make land use decisions more transparent, enable
courts to provide more meaningful and consistent judicial review, and
would protect citizens from arbitrary government actions.
330 Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. I969);see also Uniprop Manufac-
tured Hous., Inc. v. City of Lakeville, 474 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 199').
331 ARK.CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (1987); King's Ranch of Jonesboro, Inc. v. City of Jones-
boro, 2011 Ark. 123, at *3 (2oi i) (not published in the Southwest Reporter); Bridges, supra
note 89, at 27-33.
332 Barry v. Town of Amherst, 430 A.2d 132, 134 (N.H. 1981).
333 N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 67417 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp zo,).
334 Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 136-37 (Kan. 1978).
335 R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24-30 (2009).
336 Id.
337 OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 519.02 (LexisNexis 2009).
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